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Keeping Trolls Out of Courts and Out of Pocket:
Expanding the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine
Giordana Mahn*
Patent Asserting Entities (“PAEs”), often compared with the
mythological troll who lurks under a bridge it did not build, demanding
payment from anybody who wants to pass, are criticized for their
business model as a type of “holdup” on innovation. They wait until a
practicing entity infringes, then demand payment for technology that
they did not create. Their critics charge PAEs with stifling innovation,
crippling research and development, and chilling healthy competition.
And although the courts, Congress, and government agencies identified
PAEs as an issue since their recent emergence, current patent laws are
ill-suited to limit PAE litigation and combat trolling tactics. Taking
advantage of the weaknesses in the United States patent system, PAEs
command the attention of alleged infringers as a serious threat to
product companies and startups.
This Comment distinguishes PAEs from Non-Practicing Entities
(“NPEs”), focuses on PAEs and their effect on innovation and the
public, explains that PAEs are more harmful to public interest and
rightly deserve their “troll” moniker, and suggests a solution to limiting
their influence. With public interest as the underlying factor, this
Comment proposes an affirmative defense—a combination of ideas and
themes inherent in patent law with existing doctrines—to extinguish
exclusive rights of PAEs by expanding the current definition of
inequitable conduct.

* Loyola University Chicago School of Law, J.D. expected May 2014; the University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, B.S.M.E., 2009. I want to dedicate this Comment to my dad, Terry Mahn,
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to thank my mom, Gayle Novig, my dad, and my partner, Justin Petersen for their endless supply
of love, support, wisdom, and encouragement in this, and all my other pursuits. This publication
could not have been possible without your help. Also thanks to my siblings and friends for
support, to Professor Cynthia Ho for advice and ideas, and to the Junior Members and the
Editorial Board of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for their valuable perspectives and
hard work.
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that the public will benefit in a society that fosters innovation and
rewards ingenuity.1 This theory, implemented by the Framers of the
Constitution, has reverberated throughout patent legislative and judicial
history since the 1790s as the foundational purpose in the creation of a
patent system.2 Abraham Lincoln stressed the importance of “add[ing]
the fuel of interest to the fire of genius” with a reward of exclusive
rights to induce investment and innovation.3 This fundamental principle
of constitutional patent protection is sound, but the way the system has
evolved—particularly in recent years with defensive patent hoarding
and patent trolls—is not what the Framers would have envisioned.4
Over time, Congress adopted equitable doctrines—inequitable conduct
and patent misuse—to prevent unintended fraudulent and abusive
conduct by patent holders.5 More recently, among the most discussed

1. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (“[T]he
ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain
through disclosure.”); Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A
Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
407, 419 (2007) (identifying that the original patent statute required patents to have some utility);
Daniel McFeely, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who Misuse the U.S.
Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigations, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 289, 300 (2008) (discussing
the origins of patent law and its utilitarian purpose).
2. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232 (2010) (interpreting statutory language by
“restor[ing] patent law to its historical and constitutional moorings”); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,
966 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, C.J., concurring) (using history of American patent law and English
precedents to interpret patentability concepts “firmly embedded . . . since the time of the Patent
Act of 1793”), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
3. Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions, Delivered to the Phi
Alpha Society of Illinois College at Jacksonville, Illinois (Feb. 11, 1859), in 3 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 357, 357 (R. Basle ed., 1953) [hereinafter Abraham Lincoln 2d
Lecture], available at http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/discoveries.htm; see
Harkins, supra note 1, at 418 (discussing Abraham Lincoln’s passion for the patent system and
his efforts defending the system).
4. See McFeely, supra note 1, at 291–94 (noting that “patent trolls” are an unintended
negative consequence of the U.S. Patent System); Mark Summerfield, Patent Trolls: As American
as Apple Pie?, PATENTOLOGY BLOG (Aug. 1, 2012), http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/08/
patent-trolls-as-american-as-apple-pie.html [hereinafter American as Apple Pie] (arguing that the
major features of the U.S. patent system that protect innovation and small inventors contribute to
the PAE “problem”); This American Life: When Patents Attack, Chicago Public Radio (July 22,
2011) (downloaded using iTunes) [hereinafter This American Life] (“But today . . . the patent
system is doing the exact opposite of what it’s supposed to do. It’s not promoting innovation, it’s
stifling it.”).
5. Inequitable conduct may be asserted as an affirmative defense against an infringement or
validity claim. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1) (2012). “The following shall be defenses in any action
involving the validity or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: Noninfringement, absence
of liability for infringement or unenforceability.” Id.; see B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbot Labs.,
124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that the misuse doctrine evolved from the
“equitable doctrine of unclean hands, whereby a court of equity will not lend its support to
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and controversial issues with the patent system is the emergence of
Patent Asserting Entities (“PAEs”), also known as “patent trolls.”6 This
Comment follows the unintended emergence of PAEs, evaluates the
controversy, considers each position, and proposes an equitable solution
to Congress and the courts.
Unlike owners of other types of intellectual property (e.g.,
trademarks), a patentee does not have to use its patent to enforce it;
Non-Practicing Entities (“NPEs”), as their name indicates, can assert
patent rights without actually practicing the technology. 7 NPEs hold
patents, either through exclusive licensing or as owners, and assert their
rights by attempting to license these patents to alleged infringers or
threatening to sue for infringement.8
PAEs are a subgroup of NPEs often compared with the mythological
troll, who lurks under a bridge it did not build, demanding payment
from anybody who wants to pass.9 The business model of a PAE is a
type of “holdup” on innovation, waiting until a practicing entity
infringes, then demanding payment for technology that it did not
enforcement of a patent that has been misused”).
6. F.T.C., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES
WITH COMPETITION 8 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]; BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42668, AN OVERVIEW OF THE “PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE 4 (2012).
7. A patent grants a patentee rights to exclude others from making, using, selling, importing,
and offering to sell. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). Unlike patent law, a trademark owner must use its
trademark or will risk losing ownership rights to abandonment. LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH
SCOTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 605 (3d ed. 2012). A
mark is deemed abandoned when it no longer serves the purpose of indicating the source of the
goods. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012); see infra Part II.B (chronicling NPE presence in federal courts
and popular media). Copyright trolls and copyright law are not covered in this Comment.
8. See YEH, supra note 6, at 5 (claiming that the term “NPE” is used too broadly to cover
universities and independent inventors); Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying
Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 673, 690 (2012) (“While there is no clear
definition, most people use the term to refer to NPEs that acquire patents only to license or
enforce them against companies using the invention.”); cf. McFeely, supra note 1, at 294 (calling
all NPEs “patent trolls”).
9. This American Life, supra note 4. Throughout this Comment, I refer to both PAEs and
NPEs. I distinguish the two as they are very different. See infra Part II.B (discussing the
emergence of PAEs). However, many sources do not distinguish between the two, and therefore
many times I quote the original language of the authors. Congress and the FTC use the term
PAE, which excludes NPEs such as universities and small inventors. YEH, supra note 6, at 4
n.27. However, PAEs bring the most NPE suits. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua
Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 684
(2011); See also Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson Price, Patent Trolling – Why Bio &
Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk 12–13 (UC Hastings Research Paper No. 93, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2395987 (characterizing patent trolls as
“monetizers” “whose core business involves licensing and litigating patents, rather than making
products”).
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create.10 PAEs produce nothing of value but instead assert bare patent
rights against manufacturers—who often independently develop their
products without knowledge of the existing patent—after production
and marketing the technology have begun. 11 In fact, critics contend that
PAEs stifle innovation,12 cripple research and development (“R&D”),13
and chill healthy competition.14 Studies show that PAEs account for
one-half of all patent suits brought in the United States, averaging $3.17
to $7.59 million in costs per suit.15 In 2011, PAEs generated $29 billion
in revenues from defendants and licensees, a 400% increase since
2005.16 PAE suits capture public attention because of the large awards
in damages over commonly used technology. 17 This Comment
10. See Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovations, 61 AM. U. L. REV.
733, 744 (2012) (explaining how a new business of “buying patents from startups or others and
aggressively enforcing their exclusive rights in order to extract high licensing fees” proliferated in
an industry where technology is so complex and one product covers many patents). See generally
infra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing patent holdups as a successful troll tactic). A
practicing entity, or product company, uses technology covered by a patent.
11. The FTC describes the business model of a PAE as centered on “purchasing and asserting
patents against manufacturers already using the technology, rather than developing and
transferring the technology.” FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 51. This Comment expands the PAE
definition to include entities that use troll techniques. See infra Part V (proposing that PAEs and
practicing entities that implement troll techniques be treated similarly).
12. See Rajec, supra note 10, at 747 (“[PAEs] has skewed incentives to license, enabling them
to extract a higher value from patents than their patents warranted. This inefficiency negatively
affected the ability of actual innovators to bring new products to market.”); James Bessen &
Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes 21–22 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 12-34, 2012), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty
/scholarship/workingpapers/2012.html (finding that defendants reduce their research and
development (“R&D”) budgets to pay for the expensive litigation costs).
13. The FTC found that many companies factor in the likelihood of PAE litigation when
making investment decisions. FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 52–54. These expectations deter
innovation by raising costs and risk for companies to bring products to market. Id. at 42–43. As
a result, it is less likely that a company will bring products to market. Rajec, supra note 10, at
747.
14. See Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 478 (2011)
(finding that PAE tactics abuse the monopoly privilege of a patent, and thus stifle competition).
15. These costs are average accrued costs of small- and medium-sized businesses of both
litigated and non-litigated assertions. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 17 n.18.
16. Id. at 18–19.
17. See YEH, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that a successful PAE suit almost caused the shutdown
of BlackBerry® wireless service); infra note 240 and accompanying text (noting that courts often
award PAEs higher damages than practicing entities). See generally Gerard N. Magliocca,
Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1809, 1812 (2007) (explaining that the popularity of the BlackBerry suit introduced the
public to PAEs). Additionally, PAEs are known for suing multiple defendants at once. Colleen
V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of
High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1579 n.36 (2009) [hereinafter Chien, High-Tech
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distinguishes PAEs from NPEs, focuses on PAEs and their effect on
innovation and the public, explains that PAEs are more harmful to
public interest and rightly deserve their “troll” moniker, and suggests an
alternative to the current system.
Although the courts, Congress, and government agencies identified
PAEs as an issue since their recent emergence, current patent laws are
ill-suited to limit PAE litigation and combat trolling tactics.18 Taking
advantage of the weaknesses in the U.S. patent system, PAEs command
the attention of alleged infringers as a serious threat to product
companies and startups. This Comment will briefly discuss the
provisions in patent law which facilitate PAE proliferation, as well as
two doctrines that are intended to limit patent abuse, but, in practice,
have fallen short when applied to PAEs. Part I discusses the history of
patent law, including the surfacing of PAEs. Part II discusses the PAE
debate, the effect on innovation, and how courts, Congress, and federal
agencies call for reform of the patent system to prevent PAEs from
“lay[ing] traps”19 and levying “tax[es] on innovation.”20 Part III
analyzes the constitutionality of PAEs; evaluates efforts by the courts,
Congress, and federal agencies to decrease abusive litigation; and
explores proposals from the bar to limit PAEs. Finally, with public
interest as the underlying factor, Part IV proposes an affirmative
defense—a combination of ideas and themes inherent in patent law with
existing doctrines—to extinguish exclusive rights of PAEs by
expanding the current definition of inequitable conduct.
I. BACKGROUND
PAEs emerged relatively recently, but the roots of the controversy
date back to the origins of the United States patent system. With both
constitutional and statutory basis, the U.S. patent system promotes
innovation and dissemination of new technology by rewarding inventors
Patents] (noting that PAEs often send hundreds of letters to allegedly infringing companies, and
sue fifty in one suit).
18. PAEs emerged over the past ten to fifteen years with the “explosion” of the information
technology industry. YEH, supra note 6, at 8–9.
19. Richard A. Posner, Why There are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC MOBILE
(July 12, 2012), http://m.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-manypatents-in-america [hereinafter Posner, Too Many Patents].
20. YEH, supra note 6, at 6 (explaining how PAEs effectively add an extra cost onto a
consumer good because of royalty fees or litigation costs); see Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2009 (2007) (noting that a patent
owner can demand up to five times the amount it is worth in royalty fees once the alleged
infringer makes irreversible investments).
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with a temporary monopoly over their inventions. This Part will first
discuss the origin and the purposes of patent law in the United States,
describing the inspiration of the Framers of the Constitution to create
the Progress Clause and the first Patent Act. Then, this Part will explain
the basics of current U.S. patent law and the doctrines implemented to
prevent abuse. Finally, this Part will conclude with a discussion of the
emergence of PAEs, the tools of the U.S. patent system that enable
PAEs to proliferate, and the controversy surrounding PAEs.
A. Origin and Policy of Patent Law in the United States
The Framers adopted the English concept of intellectual property
when they drafted the Constitution.21 The Progress Clause of Article I
grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive
Right to their . . . Discoveries.”22 The utilitarian foundation of the
Progress Clause established a “patent bargain” by rewarding progress in
“science and useful arts” with exclusive patent rights.23 Patent
protection prevented others from copying patented works and driving
prices down.
The patent system allows innovators and their investors to recapture
investment in R&D and profit during their limited monopoly period.24
21. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The
Constitution’s Patent Clause was written against the backdrop of English patent practices . . . .”
(internal quotations omitted)). Thomas Jefferson, as well as the American Constitutionalists, was
influenced by the ideas of English theorist, John Locke. ROSEN, supra note 21, at 64–66. Locke
articulated the notion that there is a right to property when labor is added, including ideas, which
is the basis of intellectual property. Id. at 279. Jefferson referred to Locke as “one of the greatest
men who ever lived.” Id. at 60.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3236 (“Pursuant to its power [in the
Progress Clause], Congress has passed a series of patent laws that grant certain exclusive rights
over certain inventions and discoveries as a means of encouraging innovation.”). There are many
different names given to this Clause including: Intellectual Property Clause, Patent and Copyright
Clause, and Exclusive Rights Clause. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 120 n.*. Professors
Loren and Miller use “Progress” to describe the action the Clause is supposed to inspire because
the word illustrates the means Congress is empowered to use, rather than the end sought. Id.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 728 (2009) (exploring the
inequitable conduct doctrine with roots in the utilitarian theory that “underlies American
intellectual property law”); see also McFeely, supra note 1, at 300 (noting that modern
commentators, Thomas Jefferson, and the Supreme Court made clear that “the utilitarian theory
of maximizing the benefit to society [is] the policy reason behind patent law in the United
States”).
24. FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. The FTC Report explains how antitrust laws maintain a
competitive market and thus promote incentives and innovation, compatible with patent laws. Id.
Without protection, intellectual property—intangible assets—risks underproduction because of
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The Framers intended that for an inventor to obtain patent protection,
the inventor “had to serve the ends of science—to push back the
frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a distinctive
contribution to scientific knowledge.”25 Thomas Jefferson, known as
one of the most influential contributors to the Patent Act and the first
Commissioner of the Patent Office, believed that the “exclusive right to
invention was given not of natural right, but for the benefit of
society.”26 Jefferson’s view that the public interest is inherent in patent
law is one the Supreme Court shares.27
1. Patent Basics
The Patent Act of 1790 was modeled after the English Statute of
Monopolies of 1624.28 Although amended numerous times, the current
U.S. patent system has the same basic protections set forth in English
law.29 Congress established the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) to ensure that the patent system contributes to a strong
economy, encourages innovation, and fosters the “entrepreneurial
spirit.”30 The USPTO evaluates patent applications through the patent
their characteristics of “non-rivalrous consumption and non-excludability.” LOREN & MILLER,
supra note 7, at 341; see also Richard A. Posner, Patent Trolls Be Gone: How to Fix Our Broken
System for Stimulating Invention, SLATE (Oct. 15, 2012, 5:16 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2012/10/patent_protection_how_to_fix_it.html
[hereinafter Posner, Trolls Be Gone] (“[The exclusive right to use] prevents free riding by a
competitor who would, by copying the invention, avoid the cost of inventing.”).
25. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)
(Douglas, J., concurring). The Framers interpreted “science” broadly to mean knowledge and
learning. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 341.
26. McFeely, supra note 1, at 300.
27. See J.E.M. AG Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001)
(emphasizing the importance of social and economic benefit to society in patent policy goals);
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“The . . . provisions of patent law have been
cast . . . to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting ‘the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts’ with all that means for social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.’”).
28. Statue of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.); ROSEN, supra note 21, at 51; Vishwas
Devaiah, A History of Patent Law, ALT L. F. (2012), http://altlawforum.org/publications/ahistory-of-patent-law/.
29. Congress passed the first Patent Act in 1790, reformed the Patent Act in 1952, and
recently made significant changes to U.S. patent law in the America Invents Act (“AIA”) in 2011.
Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). The English
Statute of Monopolies granted the first true inventor the exclusive term of fourteen years for a
novel idea. Devaiah, supra note 28; see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239 (2010) (“[E]arly
American patent law was largely based on incorporated features of the English Patent System.”
(internal quotations omitted)).
30. Kevin Mack, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing
Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 147–48 (2006). The Patent Act of 1836
established the Patent Office for examination of patent applications. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357,
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prosecution process, rejects improper claims, and gives the applicant the
opportunity to amend for validity.31 As the law stands today,32 each
patent grants the owner “the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention.”33 Once a patent is granted,
the specification of how to make or use the patented idea or invention is
disclosed to the public.34
Direct patent infringement is a strict liability violation of federal
law.35 The patent holder may file a civil action in federal court to
enforce its exclusive rights if another infringes its patent.36 Without
requiring a patent holder to use the patent, the patentee may sue for
infringement without having to show any actual injury. 37 The Patent
§§ 1, 7, 5 Stat. 117, 117, 119–20. In its most recent Strategic Plan Report, the USPTO asserts its
vision and goals:
Promoting innovation and creativity, stimulating economic growth, and creating highpaying jobs are key priorities of the Obama Administration. By providing IP
protection in the form of patents and trademarks, the USPTO plays a key role in
fostering the innovation that drives job creation, investment in new technology and
economic recovery, and in promoting and supporting the administration’s priorities.
U.S. PATENT &TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2010–2015 STRATEGIC PLAN 2 (2010).
31. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 119–52 (including relevant cases and discussions
proving that patent prosecution is very expensive and that it can take many years to grant a
patent).
32. Anyone may buy or license a patent from the original owner. The inventor of a patented
idea is not synonymous with the owner. See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent
Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming
Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (2013) (noting that PAEs do not file their own patent
applications, but instead purchase patents from others, usually failing companies).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
34. Id.; see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (stating the
expectation that society trades the exclusive rights of an invention in exchange for “the
introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy”); McFeely, supra
note 1, at 301 (“[D]isclosure of invention and the attainment of social and economic benefits
together form the policy underpinnings behind the grant of exclusive patent rights.”).
35. A person or entity infringes on a patent by either making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore infringes the patent.”). Strict
liability holds a patent infringer liable regardless of intention, and the nature of the offense or
“good faith” is only relevant to court awarded damages. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 291.
Thus, if someone invents the patented idea on her own, she may still be held liable for
infringement absent bad faith. Id.
36. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his
patent.”). Patent lawsuits fall under the federal court’s exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
because they arise under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). A claim against the U.S. must
be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. Id. § 1498.
37. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006) (rejecting the district
court’s holding that lack of irreparable injury precludes a party from seeking an injunction);
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 201 U.S. 405 (1908) (rejecting the contention that a
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Act allows recovery for “adequate” damages for infringement, including
an equitable remedy of an injunction to prevent further infringement.38
To issue an injunction barring further infringement, courts look to the
same four factors considered in any case in which a party seeks an
injunction: (1) whether denial of the injunction would lead to
irreparable injury for the plaintiff, (2) whether money damages are
inadequate compensation, (3) whether a balance of the hardships to the
parties favors either outcome, and (4) whether the public interest favors
entry of an injunction.39
The Statute of Monopolies, written to protect England’s craftsman
from anti-competitive practices, included the requirement that the patent
“must not be ‘mischievous to the State,’” by increasing the price of
commodities at home, hurting trade, or being “generally
inconvenient.”40 Jefferson had concerns for potential abuse in the U.S.
patent system as well.41 Though finally conceding the creation of the
Patent Act, Jefferson’s apprehension was not unfounded. Over the
years, courts of equity created the patent misuse and inequitable conduct
doctrines to deter unintended abuses of the patent system.42

court of equity should not grant injunctive relief to an NPE).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed
by the court.”). Id. § 283. Upon finding willful infringement, the court may increase damages up
to three times actual damages. See Harkins, supra note 1, at 449–50. For a critique of patent
damages awards and a proposal for calculating negotiated royalty rates, see Lemley & Shapiro,
supra note 20.
39. See Rajec, supra note 10, at 741 (articulating the court’s considerations for granting
injunctions); see, e.g., eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (reversing because the Court of Appeals did not
apply the four-factor test).
40. Devaiah, supra note 28; see also ROSEN, supra note 21, at 51 (tracing the U.S. patent
system back to the English Statute of Monopolies and describing the tension in creating patent
laws—the desire to create the incentive of an award of an exclusive monopoly over an invention,
without suppressing competition).
41. Jefferson had reservations in supporting the Patent Act, for fear that granting patents
would lead to the obstruction, instead of the promotion, of progress in the science and arts.
Devaiah, supra note 28.
42. Though these doctrines are judicially created, the Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793 contain
clauses requiring that third parties seek repeal of invalid patents obtained through fraudulent
means. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323; Act of Apr., 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1
Stat. 109, 111. Additionally, each patent statute prior to the Patent Act of 1952 provided a private
remedy for inequitably obtained patents. See Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable
Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 38–40 (1993) (describing the
specific provisions that created a private remedy against procurement of patents by fraud).
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2. Patent Misuse Doctrine
The patent misuse doctrine developed in the early 1900s based on the
equitable principle that public interest “is more favorite of the law than
is the promotion of private fortunes.”43 The patent misuse doctrine
provides a safeguard against patent holders seeking to extend patent
rights beyond the patented material or term.44 An alleged infringer may
assert misuse as an affirmative defense where the patent holder attempts
to enforce its patent in a manner “contrary to public policy.”45 To
succeed in this defense, the alleged infringer must prove that the patent
holder has market power in the relevant market for the patented product,
and the patent holder’s conduct tends to exclude competitors from the
market or prevent them from entering.46 If both are proven, the court
will refuse to enforce the patent until the patent holder discontinues and
remedies, or “purges,” the abusive practice.47

43. Bohannan, supra note 14, at 481 (citing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519 (1917)). The public interest and private fortunes often collide, and a
court must balance the two in considering a plea for injunctive relief. Rajec, supra note 10, at
738 (arguing that the court should place more emphasis on the public interest). Historically, the
ITC rarely accepts a public interest argument in denying an exclusion order to a patent holder.
Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19–28 (2012). In fact, the ITC has only denied exclusion orders in cases of
public health and welfare, improved fuel efficiency, and nuclear physics research. Id. at 21–23;
Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
399, 403 (2003) (stating that misuse doctrine evolved as a response to patent holders using the
patent laws to run around the antitrust laws).
44. Bohannan, supra note 14, at 485 (discussing the equity rationale in Morton Salt Co. v.
G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), for refusing to grant relief to a patent holder who
attempted to use its patent to require its licensee to purchase other unpatented goods). Section
271(d) of the Patent Misuse Reform Act “explicitly states that ‘refus[al] to license or use any
rights to the patent’ does not alone constitute misuse such that a patent owner shall be denied
relief.” Rajec, supra note 10, at 777 n.240 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012)). Absent elements
of monopolization of the market beyond the coverage of the patent, an NPE will not be found to
have misused its patent. Id.
45. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that the
patent misuse doctrine evolved from the “equitable doctrine of unclean hands whereby a court of
equity will not lend its support to enforcement of a patent that has been misused”); see Morton
Salt, 314 U.S. at 493 (“[A] patent . . . used as a means of restraining competition . . . is . . . a
contributing factor in thwarting the public policy underlying the grant of the patent.”).
46. See Bohannan, supra note 14, at 487.
47. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(explaining that a finding of misuse renders the patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged,
but will not invalidate the patent); Feldman, supra note 45, at 402 (noting that a patent holder is
denied relief until “the abusive practice has been abandoned and the effects of the practice have
dissipated”).
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3. Inequitable Conduct Doctrine
Similar to the patent misuse doctrine, the inequitable conduct
doctrine is based on the principles of equity, and requires that those
enforcing their exclusive patent rights come to court with “clean
hands.”48 The doctrine of “unclean hands” denies injunctive or other
equitable relief to a party that acted fraudulently or in bad faith.49
Inequitable conduct is an affirmative defense to an infringement claim,
and is based on the assertion that the patent holder procured the patent
by fraudulent conduct before the USPTO.50 The USPTO follows
relevant sections of the Code of Federal Regulations that impose a duty
of candor and good faith on patent applicants during prosecution.51 If a
defendant can prove that the patent holder violated this duty, then the
patent is rendered permanently unenforceable.52
The inequitable conduct doctrine is unique in patent law, because it
speaks to the individual’s conduct, instead of the technicalities of a
claimed invention.53 To prove inequitable conduct, the defendant must
48. The Supreme Court in Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Machinery Co., was the first to establish this doctrine. 324 U.S. 806, 814–16
(1945); see also Stijepko Tokic, The Role of Consumers in Deterring Settlement Agreements
Based on Invalid Patents: The Case of Non-Practicing Entities, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 16
(“The doctrine of inequitable conduct is the patent system’s response to invalid patents procured
by deceptive conduct before the PTO and it is based on principles of equity, where those seeking
equity must come with clean hands.”).
49. See Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814 (“The doctrine is rooted in the historical
concept of court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience
and good faith.”); Mack, supra note 30, at 150 n.20 (defining unclean hands).
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1) (2012) (permitting an alleged infringer to plead
“unenforceability”). Inequitable conduct can consist of “making material misrepresentations, by
omission or commission, with the intent to mislead” during patent prosecution before the PTO
examiner. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 277.
51. 37 C.F.R. §1.56(a) (2013) (adding that “[a] patent by its very nature is affected with public
interest”).
52. In fact, a finding of inequitable conduct renders all claims of a patent unenforceable, not
only the alleged infringed claim. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863
F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“When a court has finally determined that inequitable
conduct occurred . . . during prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is rendered
unenforceable.”). The patent remains unenforceable, even if the invention actually meets patent
requirements. See, e.g., Star Sci., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (stating that “the penalty for inequitable conduct is so severe, the loss of the entire
patent even where every claim clearly meets every requirement of patentability”); see also Mack,
supra note 5, at 152 (noting that historically the Supreme Court recognized that a patent is
affected with public interest when applying the doctrine of unclean hands to patent cases).
53. See Cotropia, supra note 23, at 725 (“The nature of the inequitable conduct doctrine
makes it unique in patent law, in that it is an individual’s failure to disclose—rather than an
inherent trait of the claimed invention—that results in the denial of the protection for the
invention and other related patents.”); Mack, supra note 5, at 154 (noting that after a party meets
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prove materiality of nondisclosed information omitted by a patent
holder and culpable intent to deceive or mislead the USPTO. 54 The
inequitable conduct doctrine, considered the “atomic bomb” of patent
law because it can render patents permanently unenforceable, has a
much graver consequence than a finding of misuse or invalidity. 55
B. Emergence of PAEs and Controversy
PAEs thrive in the U.S. for three reasons: (1) U.S. patent laws do not
require a patent holder to use (practice) or license the patent;56 (2)
plaintiffs can receive damages and injunctive relief under the patent
laws without showing actual injury;57 and (3) the patent system issues
vague, and often times invalid, patents that enjoy the presumption of
validity.58 PAEs utilize the high-tech industry because the patents are

the threshold requirements of materiality and intent, the court must balance the materiality of the
information with the intent of the accused to warrant a finding of inequitable conduct).
54. Mack, supra note 5, at 152–56.
55. Therasense Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see,
e.g., Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding
patentee’s related patents unenforceable because of inequitable conduct); Lummus Indus., Inc. v.
D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267, 274 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The principle is well settled that if
inequitable conduct is established as to any claim, all claims of the patent are rendered
unenforceable.”). A finding of invalidity only renders a claim of the patent, not the entire patent,
unenforceable. Cotropia, supra note 23, at 737. For a detailed history of inequitable conduct in
the courts, see generally Goldman, supra note 42. For a critique of the doctrine, see generally
Cotropia, supra note 23.
56. The Supreme Court determined that use of a patent is not implied in U.S. patent law.
Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Match Works, 261 U.S. 24, 35 (1908).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of
his patent.”); see Rajec supra note 10, at 741. Preliminary injunctions are allowed under 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). A patent holder can seek a preliminary injunction to stop infringing
activities, which can disrupt the “free flow of goods and services, impacting not only parties but
also the public who must abruptly adjust to life without the enjoined product or service.” Chien
& Lemley, supra note 43, at 10; see, e.g., Wechsler v. Macke Int’l Trade, Inc., 486 F.3d 1286,
1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Normally, if the patentee is not selling a product by definition there can
be no lost profits. The only exception is where the patentee has the ability to manufacture and
market a product, but for some legitimate reason does not.”); see also David Hricik, Legal Ethics
and Non-Practicing Entities: Being on the Receiving End Matters Too, 27 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 793, 794 (2011) (explaining that the Patent Act does not prevent
an individual from suing another for infringement when that individual cannot show actual
damages in the form of lost profits); Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation,
Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1586 (2009) (asserting
that the most important result from eBay is that it rejected the “automatic injunction” rule); Tokic,
supra note 48, at 7 (“NPEs are entitled to preliminary injunctions against alleged infringers to
stop all alleged infringing activities.”).
58. Vague patent claims are a major concern that will not be covered in this Comment. An
issued patent is presumed to be valid, and the issue of validity can be rebutted at trial by the
alleged infringer only with clear and convincing evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a); YEH, supra note
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extremely lucrative and complex and provide many opportunities for
troll techniques.59 PAEs are characterized by their tactics, specifically
using patent holdup and significant leverage in bargaining power, to
coerce alleged infringers into paying high royalties or licensing fees to
avoid an expensive trial.60
Unlike other types of intellectual property (e.g., trademarks), a patent
holder does not have to practice the patent to maintain exclusive
rights.61 An NPE, which does not practice its patent, can be a
university,62 small startup,63 independent inventor,64 technology
development firm,65 or a PAE, for example.66 NPEs hold patents, either
through exclusive licensing or as owners, and assert their rights by
seeking licensing fees from alleged infringers or threatening to sue them

6, at 3; Cotropia, supra note 23, 732 n.35 (arguing that this presumption makes “issuance
mistakes hard to reverse” (citing Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007))).
59. An average suit costs $1.6 million through discovery and $2.8 million through trial often
where $1–25 million is at stake. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2011 REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY (2012).
60. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing patent holdup).
61. There is no use requirement in patent law. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. A
trademark, however, is deemed abandoned when it no longer serves the purpose of indicating the
source of the goods. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
62. See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 611, 618 (2008) (arguing that universities are not trolls); Mike Masnick, University of
California Won’t Give Up: Sues Facebook Over Already Rejected Patents, TECHDIRT (Sep. 13,
2012, 2:34 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120913/11135120376/university-californiawont-give-up-sues-facebook-over-already-rejected-patents.shtml [hereinafter Masnick, University
of CA] (arguing that there are some universities that troll).
63. See Love, supra note 32, at 1325 tbl.2 (listing startup, “pre-product” group as an NPE,
meaning that they intend to market their patent, but have not or could not); see also Allison et al.,
supra note 9, at 684 tbl.1 (categorizing startup, “pre-product” separately).
64. See Chien, High-Tech Patents, supra note 17, at 1587 (asserting that individual inventors
do not deserve the “troll” label because independent inventors, with fewer resources, are more
selective than PAEs about their targets in patent litigation); see also Love, supra note 32, at 1334
(finding that individual inventors who do not practice assert their patents early in term like a
product company).
65. See FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 229 (describing a R&D firm that licenses “as part of a
technology transfer program” and competes in the technology market, but not the goods market);
YEH, supra note 6, at 6 n.48 (illustrating how Qualcomm focuses on R&D—rather than acquiring
patents—and then pitches patented technologies to licensees in advanced, or ex ante patent
licensing). But see Chien, High-Tech Patents, supra note 17, at 1573 n.3 (noting that Qualcomm
reported $11.1 billion in revenue in 2008 in royalty and licensing payments from patent licenses).
66. In his empirical study, Professor Brian Love found a group of companies that
demonstrated troll-like practices such as asserting their patent late in the term. Love, supra note
32, at 5. This demonstrates that NPEs, PAEs, and product companies often blur the line between
practicing entities and trolls. Id.
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for infringement.67 NPEs may act as intermediaries to reduce
transaction costs between those who invent and those who develop and
commercialize those inventions for public use.68 Because neither PAEs
nor NPEs practice patents, they are often categorized together. In
reality, however, PAEs and NPEs are very different.
The difference between NPEs and PAEs is clear when comparing the
plaintiffs in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.69 and
NTP, Inc., v. Research in Motion, Ltd. (“BlackBerry”).70 In Continental
Paper Bag, the United States Supreme Court held that the non-use of a
patent is not grounds for denying an injunction.71 A paper bag company
brought an action to prevent its competitor from using its patent and
sought an injunction against further manufacturing.72 After the Court
found infringement, the defendant argued that the plaintiff was not
entitled to an injunction because the plaintiff only used the patent to
suppress competition.73 The Court reasoned that forcing the plaintiff to
use the patent as the defendant suggested was infeasible for its business
and would impose an unreasonable economic burden on the plaintiff. 74
The Court granted the injunction and held that the patent owner was in
the best position to determine an efficient use, or non-use, of its
patent.75
Although almost one hundred years after Continental Paper Bag,

67. See Harkins, supra note 1, at 439 (asserting that some patent owners or original inventors
become PAEs and never develop the patented products); Love, supra note 32, at 1326 (reporting
that NPEs assert patents both as exclusive licensees and as patent owners).
68. See YEH, supra note 6, at 5–6 (differentiating PAEs from NPEs as PAEs do not operate as
an intermediary to bring products to market). But see James F. McDonough III, Comment, The
Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea
Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006) (“[P]atent trolls make the patent market more efficient
by realigning market participant incentives, making patents more liquid, and clearing the patent
market.”); Nathan Myhrvold, The Big Idea: Funding Eureka!, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2010, at
48–49 (asserting that PAEs offer “department stores” for licensing and purchasing patents,
enabling individual inventors to earn returns despite lacking resources).
69. 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
70. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. (BlackBerry), 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
71. Continental Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 427 (holding that a non-user of a patent for an
improvement in paper bag machinery will not justify a court in equity withholding injunctive
relief against infringement because the patentee decided to save the expense of changing or
altering the old machines).
72. Id. at 413.
73. Id. at 428.
74. Id. at 428–29. Justice Harlan weighed the public interest against the interests of the patent
holder when he stated that “it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use [its
patent], without question of motive.” Id. at 429.
75. Id.
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PAEs first emerged in the public eye in 2005 in BlackBerry.76 In
BlackBerry, NTP sued Research in Motion (“RIM”) for infringing
NTP’s wireless email patents, which covered a small feature of the
multi-component BlackBerry® cell phone.77 Pursuing a business model
which “extracted licensing fees from companies,” NTP claimed that
RIM’s BlackBerry® device infringed on “over forty . . . claims from its
several patents-in-suit.”78 After a judgment of willful infringement, the
district court awarded NTP additional damages totaling $53 million, and
granted a permanent injunction against RIM.79 RIM appealed the
district court’s decision, and ultimately, the USPTO reviewed and
invalidated two of NTP’s patents.80 Although RIM was gaining
momentum for the appeal, RIM’s investors and customers pressured
RIM to settle the dispute for $612.5 million to avoid an injunction that
would have devastated the company.81 As a result, the exorbitant costs
of the settlement passed on to BlackBerry® customers.82
Comparing the plaintiffs in Continental Paper Bag and BlackBerry
exemplifies a very important difference between an NPE and a PAE,
and therefore both cannot fall under the same classification of NPE,
76. Rajec, supra note 10, at 742–43; see also Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 3–4 (finding
that since eBay (a year after BlackBerry) PAEs have drawn scrutiny, even “fury of the
mainstream media”).
77. BlackBerry, 418 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
78. Id. at 1290.
79. For damages, a court awards the greater of a reasonable royalty or lost profits. 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (2012); see supra note 38 (setting forth the statutory language for awards). In BlackBerry,
the trial court awarded the PAE $33 million in damages based on a reasonable royalty. McFeely,
supra note 1, at 295–97. The judge increased the award to $53 million as a punitive measure for
willful infringement. Tokic, supra note 48, at 7. Additionally, the judge instructed RIM to pay
NTP’s legal fees and issued an injunction ordering RIM to discontinue infringement activities,
meaning discontinuing the sale and marketing of the BlackBerry® device. Id. However, the
parties settled as NTP’s valid patents could have warranted the court granting a permanent
injunction. Id.
80. The Federal Circuit invalidated six of the fourteen infringement claims. McFeely, supra
note 1, at 295. While the parties negotiated a settlement, the USPTO, in a “rare move,” ordered a
review of NTP’s wireless email patents. Id. at 296. The USPTO issued final rejections for two of
NTP’s patents, and invalidated four more claims that the Federal Circuit affirmed in its earlier
holding. Id.
81. Although NTP actually asserted invalid patents, the threat of an injunction enabled NTP to
force RIM to settle for $612.5 million—twelve times the amount the district court awarded NTP
in damages. See Rajec, supra note 10, at 742–43. A permanent injunction would have shutdown
BlackBerry® systems in the United States. Sarah McBride, Patent Troll Fights Heat Up for
Start-Ups, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2012, 9:19AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012
/09/17/start-ups-fight-back-as-p_n_1889938.html.
82. See Andy Kessler, Patent Trolls vs. Progress, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2012,
www.online.wsk.com/article/SB10001424052702303772904577336483746932506.html
(calculating that the NTP essentially added six dollars to each BlackBerry® ever sold).
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PAEs, or Patent Trolls. Both plaintiffs, unable to show actual damage,
had the power to seek an injunction without practicing their patents.83
The PAE in BlackBerry exploited its power (of putting RIM out of
business) to extract a lucrative settlement with RIM, who was in no
position to bargain.84 The business models of the plaintiffs in these two
cases are clearly different: one is a competitor in the market, the other a
“virtual company” with revenue solely dependent on enforcing patent
rights.85 The law, however, does not distinguish between the two
plaintiffs. In fact, the law enables PAEs, like NTP, to take advantage of
this legal treatment and use equitable remedies as leverage over their
target.
A PAE can be a freestanding business, patent holding subsidiary,
affiliate, or a shell of an operating company seeking to participate in the
industry of asserting patents.86 One study found that PAEs account for
almost 65% of all NPE litigation.87 The terms used to describe PAEs
such as “extortionists,”88 “dirtier than dirt,”89 “blackmailers,”90
“intellectual property ambulance chasers,”91 “patent system bottom
feeders,”92 and Patent Trolls93—the most popular name—clearly

83. See Chien, supra note 17, at 1589 (describing how “injunctions appear to provide a
particularly potent weapon” for PAEs).
84. See McFeely, supra note 1, at 295–97 (“Demands for licensing and threats of litigation
(with actual litigation when necessary) are the ways in which the patent troll makes it money);
Tokic, supra note 48, at 7 (noting that BlackBerry® customers were worried about RIM’s ability
to continue to provide its services).
85. McFeely, supra note 1, at 295 (describing NTP’s business model). For more discussion
on the different NPEs and the differences between NPEs and PAEs, see generally Rajec, supra
note 10.
86. See YEH, supra note 6, at 4 n.27; This American Life, supra note 4 (following a patent
that changed in ownership many different times, including transfer to an affiliate or shell
company from its larger parent PAE firm).
87. Love, supra note 32, at 19 n.70 (finding that of the 65%, about 43% of those patents were
acquired from failed or operating companies, and 22% asserted by inventor-affiliated licensing
companies); see also Allison et al., supra note 9, at 684 (classifying each patent owner without a
troll label, and finding that the patent class responsible for the most litigation fell under “acquired
patents”).
88. This American Life, supra note 4; see also Posner, Trolls Be Gone, supra note 24 (“Patent
‘trolls’ . . . purchase large numbers of patents in the hope of using the threat of a patentinfringement suit to extort a patent-licensee fee . . . .” (emphasis added)).
89. Drop Dead Diva: Pick’s and Pakes (Lifetime television broadcast Aug. 26, 2012).
90. Merges, supra note 57, at 1588.
91. Harkins, supra note 1, at 439 (internal quotations omitted).
92. David G. Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-Grant
Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, 7 (“Some commentators have described corporate patent
trolls as ‘patent system bottom feeders’ who buy ‘improvidently-granted patents from distressed
companies for the sole purpose of suing legitimate businesses.”‘ (citation omitted)).
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demonstrate the controversy surrounding these entities.
The FTC reported that unlike NPEs—who actually transfer
technology that they or their clients invented, developed, and
patented—PAEs do not transfer anything but impose a so-called
transaction fee to avoid getting sued.94 PAEs do not produce anything
but instead assert patents against manufacturers—who often
independently develop a product without knowledge of the existing
patent—after they have already produced and marketed the
technology.95
Their business depends on aggregating patents,
identifying potential target licensees or infringers, and enforcing their
patent rights to pursue royalties under threat of litigation. 96 Generally,
the public views PAEs as “arbitrageurs,” forcing themselves between
innovation and the market for a price.97
Relying on a number of “troll” tactics enabled by the patent system,
PAEs generated $29 billion in revenues from defendants and licensees
in 2011.98 PAEs typically assert high-tech patents late in the patent

93. The term was first coined by a lawyer at Intel, who described the PAE in a lawsuit as a
troll, lying under a bridge it did not build, demanding payment from anybody who passed. This
American Life, supra note 4. Ironically, the attorney who coined the name, worked at one of the
largest PAE companies later in his career. Id.; see also Tokic, supra note 47, 3 n.17 (“The term
‘patent troll’ is highly controversial because under Detkin’s definition of patent trolls, most U.S.
universities and many individual inventors such as Thomas Edison, who made a fortune from
many patents that he never practiced, would be characterized as patent trolls.”).
94. FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 40; see Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent Used as a
Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/
patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-competition.html (describing a so-called “patent tax”
that adds 20% of R&D costs to software and electronic companies).
95. See FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 50–51 (reporting that infringement is rarely intentional
because the infringers likely do not know about the existing patent). The FTC described the
business model of a PAE as centered on “purchasing and asserting patents against manufacturers
already using the technology, rather than developing and transferring the technology.” Id. at 50–
51.
96. Some acquire patents for a “one-stop-shop” defensive patent pool, licensing patents to
companies anticipating litigation. This American Life, supra note 4 (quoting the CEO of one of
the largest PAE firms describing his company as a department store for buying and licensing
patents); see also Ashby Jones, Patent ‘Troll’ Tactics Spread, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303292204577514782932390996.html
(discussing the spread and growth of PAEs and defensive patent aggregates).
97. YEH, supra, note 6, at 4; see Magliocca, supra note 17, at 1812 (pointing to PAEs taking
advantage of the “large gap between the cost of getting a patent and the value that can be captured
with an infringement action”).
98. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 18–19; see also Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua
Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation,
11 DUKE L. &. TECH. REV. 357 (2012) (noting the significant rise in PAE-filed lawsuits in the
past five years).
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term and utilize patent holdup and ex post licensing.99 PAEs benefit
from considerable leverage and bargaining power over their targets.
First, PAEs neither have a product nor practice a patent. Thus, they
have no threat of countersuit for infringement, accumulate significantly
lower costs, and risk much less at trial.100 Second, they target
vulnerable defendants who easily succumb to settlement instead of
challenging the allegations at trial.101 Third, PAEs can recover damages
often ranging in the millions without showing injury to their market
share.102
PAEs make most of their revenue by licensing ex post facto. 103 In an
ex post licensing scenario, a PAE will buy and assert a patent against an
unsuspecting company that has already begun using the patented
technology.104 Studies show that PAEs frequently buy patents only
after the technology is ubiquitous in an industry, and on average assert
the patents twelve years into the twenty-year patent term.105 The PAE

99. Patented material is not always valid; many times the PAE’s patent is so vague that it
would be invalid if challenged. Posner, Trolls Be Gone, supra note 24. However, because of the
presumption of validity, PAEs can still enforce the patent until proven invalid, costing companies
time and money in litigation costs.
100. Christopher Harkins, a patent litigator, explains the asymmetry of risk between a PAE
and a product company:
While the patent troll might hold out for the proverbial big pay day, the manufacturer
defendant needs to consider the loss of revenues from a business unit being shut down
by an injunction, costing jobs to employees working on the accused products, as well
as the reality of answering to shareholders in shareholder litigation in the form of a
derivative suit.
Harkins, supra note 1, at 443–45.
101. See This American Life, supra note 4 (recounting a small start-up company’s
experience—the company received a letter accusing it of patent violations and requesting that it
arrange settlement and payment immediately).
102. See American as Apple Pie, supra note 4 (arguing that patent trolls thrive in the U.S.
specifically because of the U.S. patent system and laws); see also Ryan Davis, ‘Patent Trolls,’
Other NPEs Win Higher Damages: Report, LAW360 (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:40 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/377585/-patent-trolls-other-npes-win-higher-damages-report
[hereinafter Davis, Higher Damages] (reporting that between 2006 and 2011, the median
damages award was $6.9 million for NPEs and $3.7 million for practicing entities).
103. See This American Life, supra note 4 (revealing that the founder and vice chairman of
Intellectual Ventures, a “super-PAE,” admitted that the bulk of the PAE firm’s revenue is from
“people” using the patent before and after his firm bought the patent).
104. The PAE will identify the valuable technology—most often in high-tech patents—look
for opportunities for existing or potential infringement, and then buy the patent from the inventor
of the infringed patent. Merges, supra note 57, at 1590–91 (discussing how a patent troll strategy
is to “take advantage of ‘lock-in’” by waiting until “technology is fully entrenched before
scouting around for patents”).
105. Love, supra note 32, at 24–25 (finding that NPEs begin litigating the patent with nine
years left in the patent term, finishing in the final years of the term (much later than practicing
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will notify the product company of alleged infringement and threaten
litigation unless the company licenses the patent in order to continue
production.106 For the most part, PAEs assert high-tech patents
covering a very small component of a much larger, complex, multicomponent device.107 This tactic is essentially a “patent holdup” where
a PAE can overcharge a defendant through licensing fees because the
defendant cannot afford to take its product off the market.108
The threat of litigation is an effective tactic for a PAE to convince an
alleged infringer to settle without challenging the PAE’s patent.109
With significant investments sunk into a product, a company must
choose between paying an usurious demand on a possibly invalid patent
or going to trial and risk being enjoined.110 PAE litigation is very
expensive, averaging $3 to $8 million per suit,111 and product
companies will settle nine times out of ten even with a strong defense of
non-infringement.112

entities which litigate early in the patent term)); see also Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42
SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 490 (2012) (finding an average of seven years between the issuance of
a patent and the filing a complaint for infringement).
106. See This American Life, supra note 4 (describing a PAE’s letter of infringement notice—
”you’re in violation of three of the patents that our company holds. You must contact us
immediately to arrange payment and settlement, or we will be taking you to court”).
107. See Merges, supra note 57, at 1597–1601.
108. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 6; Merges, supra note 57, at 1599 (calling PAEs
“opportunistic litigation mills, not research firms[,] . . . exploiting the widespread perception that
where there is a patent there must be innovation”).
109. Alleging willful infringement is another very powerful tactic for PAEs. Tokic, supra
note 48, at 9. Case law and the Patent Act give trial judges discretion to award treble damages
and attorneys’ fees for willful infringement. Id.; see, e.g., BlackBerry, 418 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (reversing in part and affirming in part the trial court’s finding of willful
infringement).
110. See Tokic, supra note 48, at 6 (finding that PAEs target the largest, most well-known
technology companies more frequently than any other individual or company because they
already have products on the market). PAEs set the royalty demand ranging from $100,000 to
$700,000 below the average litigation costs of $2 million and two to three years of trial.
McBride, supra note 78.
111. These costs are average accrued costs of small- and medium-sized businesses of both
litigated and non-litigated assertions. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 24, 36–37.
112. See Brief for Yahoo! Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2–3, 6–7, eBay
Inc. v MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) (asserting that PAEs have little
incentive to cross-license and companies with strong defenses have a strong incentive to settle).
In infringement cases between practicing entities, the parties may reach an agreement by crosslicensing—an option unavailable when dealing with PAEs. Bryant, supra note 8, at 677.
Practicing parties also have the opportunity to counter-sue, but because PAEs do not practice the
patent, defenders cannot allege counter-infringement. Id. But see McBride, supra note 81
(reporting on a recent tendency for young companies to go to trial instead of settling, therefore
preventing future claims against other companies). Settlements tend to be half the cost of
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Critics characterize PAEs as predatory and opportunistic “bottomfeeders” who will capitalize on any opportunity, no matter the victim.113
Large corporations provide an obvious target because of their deep
pockets, but small inventors and innovative startups also fall victim to
PAEs.114 PAEs easily exploit small inventors and struggling companies
by buying valuable patents for much less than their actual worth.115 In
one noteworthy patent acquisition, TechSearch asserted a $50,000
patent it purchased from a bankrupt firm to file a $500 million patent
infringement suit against Intel.116
On the other hand, PAEs argue that they create an efficient market as
a crusading middleman benefiting small inventors and the general
public.117 First, they claim to level the playing field for small inventors
and startups.118 PAEs, funded by venture capitalists, can provide the
money for litigation against large competitors that would otherwise
“crush” small businesses and infringe their valid patents with
“impunity.”119 Second, PAEs claim to encourage innovation by helping
struggling businesses recoup their R&D costs.120 And finally, PAEs
litigated suits. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 24.
113. See Harkins, supra note 1, at 439 (“[S]ome claim that patent trolls exploit solo inventors,
small companies, and those on the brink of bankruptcy.”); Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The
Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-competition.html (reporting that since
2006, Apple has been sued 135 times mostly by patent trolls “interested in its deep pockets”).
114. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 12, 22 (rebutting the argument that PAEs only
target large companies with deep pockets); Tokic, supra note 48, at 6 (finding that PAEs target
the largest, most well-known technology companies more frequently than any other individual or
company from 2006–2010, including HP, Apple, AT&T, Sony, and Microsoft); McBride, supra
note 81 (noting that Hipmunk, a startup technology company, received an infringement claim
from a PAE after it announced $15 million in new funding).
115. See Risch, supra note 105, at 427 (finding that PAEs bought patents from companies that
no longer operate).
116. See also McFeely, supra note 1, at 294.
117. See Bryant, supra note 8, at 679–80 (noting the counterargument that PAEs act as
efficient licensing entities); Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis
of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 119–31 (2010) (arguing that PAEs benefit
the patent system as they are “market-makers”).
118. See FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 68 (finding that independent inventors have difficulty
negotiating royalty payments from large product companies without a credible threat of an
expensive infringement suit); Shrestha, supra note 117, at 127–28 (arguing that small inventors
and startups lack the necessary resources to develop and market their patents and cannot afford to
prevent larger companies from infringing their patents without the economic backing of a PAE).
119. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 20 (quoting Risch, supra note 105, at 459); see
McDonough, supra note 68, at 212 (“Unlike the individual inventor who poses no real litigation
threat, the patent dealer has ample funds with which to litigate.”); This American Life, supra note
4 (noting that PAE firms are often backed by venture capitalists expecting a large return).
120. See infra notes 166–70 and accompanying text.
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claim to be the intermediaries necessary for an efficient patent system
by reducing transaction costs between those who invent and those who
develop and commercialize.121 As an intermediary, PAEs can promote
innovation by managing risk of investments and compensating small
investors from their settlements and licensing agreements.122
Additionally, PAEs profess to serve an important function as a filter in
the patent system: they become experts in valuing different types of
patents and, thus, benefit inventors of valuable patents with expert
appraisals.123
Despite PAEs’ arguments to the contrary, PAEs
overwhelmingly burden the nation’s economy, outweighing any
potential positive effects they may have.
II. DISCUSSION
In just a matter of years, PAEs became widely discussed as a major
problem with the current patent system.124 PAE infringement suits
overwhelm federal courts, accumulate the largest costs, and have
millions of dollars at stake.125 This Part presents studies from both
sides of the debate examining the effects of PAEs on innovation. First,
this Part discusses the arguments between PAEs and their critics. This
Part will explore the PAE impact on public interest and the patent
system in general. Finally, this Part details recent federal court
decisions, federal agency opinions, and new and proposed legislation
that seek to prevent PAEs from “lay[ing] traps”126 and levying “tax[es]
121. See James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 REG. 26
(2011) (noting that many intermediaries do not have to employ “trolling techniques”);
McDonough, supra note 68, at 190 (arguing that patent trolls provide efficiency by encouraging
innovation and creating incentives).
122. See Myhrvold, supra note 67, at 48–49 (pioneering his company as a “capital market for
inventions akin to the venture capital market that supports startups and the private equity market
that revitalizes inefficient companies”); Shrestha, supra note 117, at 119–31 (describing two
views on NPEs).
123. Shrestha, supra note 117, at 128 (“By repeatedly analyzing and buying patents, [PAEs]
become experts at differentiating between valuable and trivial patents and rewarding the inventors
accordingly.”).
124. See Rajec, supra note 10, at 743 (“NPEs entered public consciousness in earnest during
the litigation surrounding BlackBerry® technology.”); Reyhan Harmanci, Patent Trolling: It’s as
Bad as You Think, BUZZFEED (Oct. 12, 2012, 1:27 PM), http://www.buzzfeed/com/reyhan
/patent-trolling-its-as-bad-as-you-think (noting that patent trolls have received significant
attention in the past decade).
125. See Davis, Higher Damages, supra note 102.
126. Judge Richard A. Posner wrote an article describing the current problems with the patent
system. Posner, Too Many Patents, supra note 19. Among other issues, he discusses the problem
with patent trolls and how they “lay traps for producers.” Id. Additionally, he notes
characteristics of the current patent system that benefit patent trolls: (1) the Seventh Amendment,
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on innovation.”127
A. PAE Effects on Innovation and Public
Much controversy surrounds PAEs and their effects on innovation in
the United States.128 Despite the extensive discussion surrounding
PAEs, there is little information that conclusively proves the negative
effects of PAEs on innovation.129 This lack of conclusive knowledge
could be due to several reasons. First, almost nine out of ten NPE
lawsuits settle, making it very difficult to aggregate information
concerning these undisclosed dealings.130 Second, most of the licensing
agreements are confidential.131 Despite these challenges, experts in the
field performed and reported empirical studies providing evidence
supporting the assertion that PAEs negatively affect innovation and the
public interest.132
The proportion of PAE litigation to all infringement suits varies
drastically depending on the source.133 PAEs maintain that “trolls” are
essentially obsolete and were invented by disgruntled defendants.134
Nathan Myhrvold, the CEO and founder of one of the largest PAE
firms, claimed that PAEs only account for 2% of all infringement

which confers the right to a jury trial in federal court, (2) understaffing of the USPTO, and (3)
notice failure of existing patents. Id.
127. YEH, supra note 6, at 6.
128. Compare Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12 (using a survey and a database of litigation
statistics to estimate the direct costs NPEs contribute to incentives to innovate), and YEH, supra
note 6 (discussing the “patent troll” debate, effects on innovation, and recent and proposed
legislative actions), with Risch, supra note 105, at 491–93 (arguing that PAEs help, rather than
harm, startups and small businesses).
129. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 3; Love, supra note 32, at 1312–16; Harmanci,
supra note 124.
130. Tokic, supra note 48, at 1; see Allison et al., supra note 9, at 694 (finding that NPEs
settle 89.6% of their cases).
131. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 3; Love, supra note 32, at 1310–11.
132. See FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 67–68 (concluding that the benefits of PAE activity
“appear . . . ambiguous at best”); Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 12 (concluding from a
survey of eighty-two firms, with a total of 1184 defenses against NPE litigation, that NPEs—
including PAEs, inventors, and universities—reduce the net amount of investment in innovation).
But see Risch, supra note 105, at 460 (studying ten of the most litigious PAEs and concluding
that their patents are valid, contrary to popular belief).
133. Professor Brian J. Love analyzed many empirical studies that attempted to put a
percentage on PAE litigation and found many inconsistencies. Love, supra note 32, at 1310–12,
1315–16. The data pools included the ten most litigious NPEs, the most litigated patents, and a
study of only the newsworthy PAEs. Id. at 3 n.1.
134. See Merges, supra note 57, at 1586 (“Some believe the troll label is a meaningless
epithet, applied only to a plaintiff in a patent lawsuit with whom one has a legal conflict.”).
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suits.135 In contrast, other experts in the field assert that their findings
show that PAEs are responsible for almost half of all infringement suits
in the United States.136 The large discrepancy between findings of 2%
and 50% does not necessarily invalidate PAE impact, but exemplifies
the difficulty in definitively studying PAEs. 137 Before Congress limited
joinder, PAEs often joined over 100 defendants in one suit; impacting
over 100 companies, but statistically accounting for only one suit.
Additionally, PAEs assert their patents late in the twenty-year patent
term.138 Consequently, counting one year of PAE lawsuits does not
necessarily correlate with a PAE’s agenda.
The PAE debate, largely biased and factually supported by anecdotal
evidence and projection,139 includes the following assertions against
PAEs: (1) PAEs use weak patents to engage in frivolous litigation, and
(2) PAEs drive up the cost of products and directly affect the public by
extracting unreasonably high licensing fees from manufacturers. Critics
argue that PAEs engage in these tactics because of the nature of hightech patents.140
Asserting high-tech patents is a very lucrative business for PAEs,141
providing opportunities for patent hold up and asserting weak
patents.142 High-tech and business method patents, including software
135. Myhrvold and Risch argue that PAEs only account for a small number of NPE suits.
Risch, supra note 105, at 466; Nathan Myhrvold, Inventors Have Rights, Too!, WALL ST. J., Mar.
30, 2006, at A14; see also Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary
Creatures: A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED. CIR. B.J.
165, 166 (2007) (estimating that “trolls” only account for a 2% of NPE litigation).
136. Bryant, supra note 8, at 679; see also Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 2009 (finding
that PAEs file 30–40% of all patent suits in the computing and electronics industries).
137. Past studies do not accurately reflect the economic impact of PAEs in a given year,
according to Professor Brian Love. See Love, supra note 32, at 1334 (“Thus, the bare statistic
that [PAEs] account for only about one-fifth of all patents litigated obscures the fact that [PAEs]
account for the majority of patents litigated in the final few years of the term—the only portion of
the term when they are actively asserting their patent rights.”); see also Chien, High-Tech
Patents, supra note 17, at 1601 (accounting for the number of defendants in PAE suits, rather
than solely the number of individual suits, significantly changed her results).
138. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (finding that PAEs assert their patents around
twelve years into the patent term).
139. Jeruss et al., supra note 98, at 362.
140. See Chien, High-Tech Patents, supra note 17, at 1580–81 (explaining the reasons that
NPEs emerged from the high-tech industry: (1) acquisition from distressed or bankrupt
companies—casualties from the Internet bubble; (2) products in the industry tend to be covered
by multiple patents, increasing the likelihood of infringement; and (3) easier to file a paper patent
that can be “bought and sold free of underlying technology”).
141. See Tokic, supra note 48, at 5 (“[I]n the past seven years, there have been at least fifteen
judgments and settlements . . . with at least five topping $500 million.”).
142. Professor Love found in his studies that PAEs dominate in industries where “innovation
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patents, have ambiguous construction of patent claims, cover extremely
complex technology, and are easy to acquire.143
Because PAEs rarely win on the merits at trial, critics claim that they
assert weak and invalid patents to engage in frivolous lawsuits.144
Frequently, weak patents are inappropriately equated with invalid
patents; but weak can also mean broadly construed claims. 145 Critics
accuse PAEs of using weak or invalid patents with ambiguous claims
and scope to reach products of seemingly unrelated technology. 146
PAEs argue that these criticisms have no statistical support because
PAEs frequently settle without challenging patent validity. 147
According to Villanova University School of Law Professor Michael
Risch, PAEs’ low success rate is unrelated to the validity or weakness
of the patents.148 Risch explains PAEs often fail because they depend
is rapid and cheap” and PAEs are nowhere to be found “where innovation is slow and expensive.”
Love, supra note 32, at 1348. Other industries also allow for patent holdup because of their
complex nature, such as biotechnology and medical research. Rajec, supra note 10, at 746.
143. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2011) (noting that the Court in eBay
discussed that business method patents “raise special problems in terms of vagueness and suspect
validity”). However, see Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson Price, Patent Trolling – Why Bio &
Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk, supra note 9, which argues that biotechnology and pharmaceutical
patents are also vulnerable to “patent monetization.”
144. See Tokic, supra note 48, at 1 (explaining that nine out of ten lawsuits with NPEs settle,
which raises doubts of the validity of their patents). Additionally, Tokic argues that the “current
legal framework is still ill-suited to deter settlements based on invalid patents.” Id. at 18. Tokic’s
analysis is supported by what many refer to as a “paper patent.” See also Chien, High-Tech
Patents, supra note 17, at 1581 n.47 (“A paper patent is a patent covering an invention that exists
only on paper, and the invention has not been made or operated.”); cf. Shrestha, supra note 117,
at 120–21 (“A recent, more comprehensive study, also based on data from Stanford’s IPLC,
found that NPEs initiated about seventeen percent of patent infringement suits between January 1,
2000 and March 21, 2008.”).
145. Software patents tend to be very broad as there are many ways to write a computer
program. See Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 113.
146. Love, supra note 32, at 1344. While PAEs predominantly stay within the high-tech
industry, many argue that PAEs disrupt the patent system in general. Id.; see also Tokic, supra
note 48, at 5 n.26 (‘“It is increasingly routine to read a single lawsuit in which an NPE/plaintiff
has sued a dozen or more companies. For example, a plaintiff recently . . . named 22 companies
as defendants, asserting that each was infringing the plaintiff’s broadly-worded patents . . . .”‘
(quoting Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Steven Appleton,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Micron Tech., Inc.), available at
http://www.patentfairness.org/pdf/appleton_20090310.pdf )).
147. See Harkins, supra note 1, at 434–37 (arguing that rising costs of patent litigation
increasingly make challenging patent validity more prohibitive); Risch, supra note 105, at 481
(pointing to the lack of proof of the allegation that PAEs use weak patents). Many PAEs sue
companies with invalid patents, and because of the presumption of validity, they can assert their
rights until proven invalid at trial.
148. Risch, supra note 105, at 481 (arguing that the most litigious patents asserted by PAEs
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on overly broad constructions of patent claims.149 Furthermore, a
rational PAE would not sue for infringement with an invalid patent
considering the high costs of patent litigation and the low probability of
a successful outcome.150
High-tech patents are complex, multi-faceted technology providing
many opportunities for infringement. Often times, a PAE owns a patent
on a small piece of a multi-component, complex product.151 The
defendant may infringe on just one protected piece of the technology,
and the PAE can threaten to shut down the entire manufacture and sale
of that product.152 This holdup threat enables PAEs to demand high
royalty or license fees that reflect the entire value of the product, not
solely the value of the piece or component that the patent protects.153
Likewise, PAEs own patents covering standard essential technology,
commonly used throughout an industry, and assert these patents by

are on par with other patents by objective standards of value and quality); see YEH, supra note 6,
at 5 (arguing instead that PAEs often lose on the merits of infringement cases because they
depend on overly broad constructions of the patents in question).
149. Risch, supra note 105, at 481. Claims can be interpreted in different ways by the court
using different sources to define the language. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 133–35.
Depending on the language, context, and reference, patent claims can be construed differently.
Id. Therefore, a patent can be valid, but because a patent holder depends on a broad construction
of those claims, a court may find non-infringement. Non-infringement does not mean that the
patent holder’s patent is invalid, but that the patent does not cover the defendant’s activity.
150. See Shrestha, supra note 117, at 120 (asserting that it is doubtful PAEs have invalid
patents for this reason). But see Allison et al., supra note 9, at 694 (“[I]t is surprising that product
companies and NPEs settle at the same rate given their very different win rates . . . .”); see also
Shrestha, supra note 117, at 120 (noting that the cost to mount an infringement suit as plaintiff is
about $2 million ). This calculation cites the cost of an average patent infringement for a
plaintiff, not a PAE. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek
Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 551 (2004). A PAE “commonly has few
documents beyond the patent and prosecution history.” Harkins, supra note 1, at 443.
151. For example, thousands of patents are essential for a standard 3G cellular telephone
system. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1992; see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-Commons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI.
698 (1998) (explaining that biomedical researchers underuse scarce resources because the
proliferation of patents on small components allow owners to restrict use); Carl Shapiro,
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Settling, in
INNOVATION POLICY & THE ECONOMY 119, 119–23 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (exploring
the effect of a patent thicket—a situation where too many owners hold overlapping patents—on
cumulative technological development).
152. See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text (discussing the remedies in patent
infringement cases).
153. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 2009 (“The technology does not have any
greater inherent value when used as part of an industry standard, but the patent holder can
demand almost five times as much money once the industry has made irreversible investments.”).
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seeking licenses ex post facto.154
Patent hold up is the most successful troll tactic and is best utilized
when a troll attempts to license ex post facto.155 Ex post facto licensing
occurs when a PAE waits until a product entity invests money and time
in R&D of a product independently before it threatens the entity with an
infringement lawsuit.156 Ex post facto transactions are very lucrative,
because the licensing negotiations are driven by the possible award in
damages that may result from trial and not the value of the patent or
commercial value.157 Demanding these inflated prices “after-the-fact”
can prevent or stall these products from coming to market.158 More
often than not, the product company adds an extra fee to products to
make up for the royalties or licensing.159
Empirical studies of PAE litigation show that the costs of PAE suits
are generally wasteful, divert company funds allocated for R&D to pay
for litigation, and do not increase innovative incentives. 160 Whatever
the benefit, PAEs do more harm to product companies, innovation, and
the public than good. In a survey of forty-six companies, Professors
James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer from Boston University School of
Law calculated that of the $29 billion defendants paid in 2011 from

154. FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 192 n.65; see, e.g., Broadcom v. Qualcomm, Inc., 543
F.3d 683, 704 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (delaying implementation of an injunction because immediate
issuance would adversely affect those who use standard essential technology including the public,
network carriers, and related manufacturers).
155. See generally Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 2009 (arguing that patent holdup is
the most powerful weapon in the patent troll’s arsenal).
156. The FTC Report distinguishes NPEs from PAEs by their different licensing practices.
FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 40. Ex ante patent transactions, which occur before the purchaser
obtains the technology, better promote the transfer of technology, “advancing innovation, creating
wealth, and increasing competition.” Id.; see id. at 40 n.43 (differentiating ex post patent
transactions, “which occur after the use of the technology has invested in its independent
invention and development, without input from the patentee”); YEH, supra note 6, at 6 n.47
(illustrating that a development firm, like Qualcomm, focuses on R&D of technologies, not
acquiring patents, and then pitches its patented technologies to licensees in advance); see also
Love, supra note 32, at 1329–41 (finding that NPEs, along with product companies, practice their
patents when the technology is new, rather than when the technology is ubiquitous).
157. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (identifying the PAE business model which exploit defendants with patent holdup);
FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 57 (describing how ex ante licensing negotiations are driven by
more realistic costs such as likely commercial value).
158. Rajec, supra note 10, at 474; see Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1992–93 (pointing
out that the PAE tactics enable them to charge higher royalty fees with the threat of injunctive
relief and even higher litigation costs).
159. Additionally, companies will factor possible litigation costs into the final price of the
product. See FTC REPORT, supra note 104, at 52–54.
160. See infra notes 161–65 (discussing the impact on innovation and incentive).
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PAE suits,161 only 25% contributed to innovation, while 75% were
categorized as “deadweight loss” to society.162 These costs of litigation
or licensing fees subtract from opportunity costs likely spent on R&D to
improve technology.163 Bessen and Meurer categorize these costs to
defend PAE suits as social losses—representing reduced incentives in
innovation—that do not transfer in the form of royalty payments to
small inventors as PAEs suggest.164 The startups and innovative
companies are less likely to invest in R&D, because they become
“targets for litigation mainly when they introduce innovative
products.”165
Despite these statistics supporting the harmful effect of PAEs, their
supporters argue that PAEs promote innovation by providing an
incentive for independent inventors and small businesses. Heavily
funded by investors, PAEs provide a litigation threat for small inventors
who also lack the necessary resources to develop and market a
product.166 Additionally, the growing number of PAE firms offers a
competitive market for large and small companies to sell their patent
portfolios.167 PAEs have an incentive to purchase these patents to sue
161. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 24. Direct costs include the cost of outside legal
services, license fees, and other direct costs incurred in response to NPE litigation risk, excluding
direct costs to a defendant’s business. Id. Indirect costs include diversion of resources; delays in
new products; loss of market share; opportunity costs of legal, managerial, engineering, and
scientific personnel; and innovative R&D. Id. at 24 n.3. The median decline in common stock of
a PAE defendant is $20.4 million. Bryant, supra note 8, at 693.
162. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 9, 20–22. Bessen and Meurer calculated deadweight
loss as wasted resources to defense costs in litigation diverted from R&D of a product. Id. No
more than 25% of direct spending by defendants promotes innovative activity. Id.
163. See YEH, supra 6, at 6–7 (“Faced with lower profit margins and uncertain but potentially
significant risk, manufactures may find that some R&D projects, features, and product
improvements are simply not worth doing, even if beneficial to customers.”); Mike Masnick,
Patent Trolls Causing Serious Problems for Startups, TECHDIRT (Sept. 17, 2012, 8:01 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120915/01425620391/patent-trolls-causing-serious-problemsstartups.shtml [hereinafter Masnick, Problems for Startups] (quoting Professor Colleen Chien,
stating, “[a] large percentage of [survey] responders reported ‘significant operational impact’:
delayed hiring or achievement of another milestone, change in the product, a pivot in business
strategy, shutting down a business line or the entire business, and/or lost valuation.”).
164. Bessen et al., supra note 121, at 5 (defining social loss).
165. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 22. Additionally, the high risk of PAE litigation
deters startups from innovating because they cannot afford the high costs associated with
litigation.
166. See Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 636, 636 (2007) (“Small companies and individuals have few good options for licensing
their patents or developing their inventions without interference from infringers.”).
167. See FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 68 (explaining the emergence of the secondary
market, where patents are bought, sold, and licensed more frequently); see also Myhrvold, supra
note 67, at 44–45 (asserting that his company, and other PAEs, absorb the risk that would have
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practicing entities, and therefore contribute to innovation by
compensating small inventors to focus on continued development.168
With incoming revenue from licensing or royalty payments, a struggling
product company may assert patents for survival and to keep up with
new technology.169 For example, Kodak, a product company, exercised
trolling techniques to raise funds for R&D.170
Studies show that PAEs harm rather than help small businesses and
startups. Additionally, PAEs have a much more detrimental impact on
small to medium size companies than large companies.171 One study
found that the median decline in common stock value of a defendant in
a PAE lawsuit is $20.4 million.172 Because the threat of PAE litigation
is so commonplace, startups may face more difficulty raising funds
from investors who anticipate such litigation costs.173 In fact, investors
have shifted funding to PAE firms as they offer greater returns than
startups.174

been borne by investors).
168. See FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 68–69 (“Representatives of PAEs maintain that their
patent purchases and assertions against operating companies promote innovation by
compensating inventors who can then direct their energies toward making more inventions.”); see
also Myhrvold, supra note 67, at 48 (promoting his company, Intellectual Ventures, as a resource
for small inventors who “prefer to just hand off their invention to a licensee and move on to the
next great idea”).
169. See Love, supra note 32, at 39–40 (finding that the product companies asserting patents
at the end of the patent term practice troll tactics “hoping to keep their doors open just a little
while longer”); see also Chien, High-Tech Patents, supra note 17, at 1585 (describing the product
companies that use troll tactics as companies that “mount[] aggressive patent enforcement
campaign[s] against other firms just prior to filing bankruptcy”).
170. PAEs include all entities using trolling techniques, including product companies
asserting patents in efforts to keep afloat. Kodak, for example, adopted trolling techniques to
“fund the transformation that the company [was] experiencing from analog manufacturing space
to a digital space.” FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 68 n.94. In recent years, Kodak “went on a
patent binge” acquiring small startups and investing in patents to “beef up its digital imaging IP.”
Love, supra note 32, at 40 n.12; see also Jones, supra note 96 (reporting how patent troll tactics
spread to product companies, such as digital watermarking company Digimarc Corp., which sold
the right to market and license its patent portfolio to Intellectual Ventures for $36 million and
20% of the profits from Digimarc’s portfolio).
171. Bessen and Meurer’s study shows that the financial burden of PAE activity falls mostly
on small- and medium-sized companies, accounting for 90% of defendants. Bessen & Meurer,
supra note 12, at 24. Small inventors and startups are just as likely as large companies to be
targeted. McBride, supra note 78.
172. Bryant, supra note 8, at 679; see Bessen et al., supra note 121, at 30 tbl.3, 31 (defining
costs to include direct costs of legal fees, lost business, management distraction and diversion of
resources, and reduction in expectation profits from future opportunities affected by the lawsuit).
173. See This American Life, supra note 4 (describing patent lawsuits as so common that “it’s
hard to find even one semi-successful startup . . . that has not been hit with a suit”).
174. See Rajec, supra note 10, at 744 (“New business models included companies that, rather
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B. Call for Reform and Efforts to Eliminate PAEs
The rise in abusive litigation initiated by PAEs and the effect on
innovative companies did not go unnoticed. Over the past decade,
courts, Congress, and government agencies have voiced concerns and
attempted to combat the trolling tactics. In eBay v. MercExchange
L.L.C.,175 the Supreme Court specifically identified PAEs and
articulated their unique business model for asserting patents. 176 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy—joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer—reasoned that new situations arising in court may
call for new analysis before granting injunctions to PAEs.177 In Justice
Thomas’ opinion for a unanimous Court, the Court explained that NPEs
and PAEs should not be classified together, but that the patent system
should reform to limit PAE bargaining power.178
than practicing the technology themselves, made a business of buying patents from startups or
others and aggressively enforcing their exclusive rights . . . .”); see also YEH, supra note 6, at 7
n.59 (citing The International Commission and Patent Disputes: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet, 112th Cong. (2012); Oversight of
the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential Patents, Hearing
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Connie V. Chien)) (stating that
investors realized PAEs offer better returns on investment than many startups, and have shifted
their funds to PAEs).
175. 547 U.S. 388, 390–96 (2006).
176. Id. at 393; see Rajec, supra note 10, at 749–50 (noting that the Supreme Court in eBay
warned against using broad classifications of patent holders to grant injunctions).
177. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence had
the most influential effect on the district courts as he explains patent holdup and PAE leverage:
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. . . . For these firms, an
injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy
licenses to practice the patent. When the patented invention is but a small component
of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be
sufficient to compensate for infringement and an injunction may not serve the public
interest. . . . [It] should be recognized that district courts must determine whether past
practice [of granting injunctions] fits the circumstances of cases before them.
Id.
178. In the Court’s opinion, Justice Thomas warns against broad classifications of NPEs in
granting injunctions:
[S]ome patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors, might
reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the
financing necessary to bring their works to market themselves. Such patent holders
may be able to satisfy the traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for
categorically denying them the opportunity to do so.
Id. at 393 (majority opinion); see Rajec, supra note 10, at 750 (arguing that the Court suggested
in eBay that PAEs may be less entitled to injunctive relief, and that the courts should consider
“the nature of the patent being enforced” and the economic intent of the patent holder).
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After eBay, PAEs no longer obtained injunctions as easily through
the district courts,179 and consequently turned to the International Trade
Commission (“ITC”)180 as a forum to obtain exclusion orders.181 PAEs
seek exclusion orders to bar a party from importing a product into the
United States which infringes on some intellectual property. 182 Because
so much technology is manufactured internationally, PAEs found the
ITC to be a useful forum for their high-tech patents.183 If a PAE fails in
federal court, it can file at the ITC to seek an exclusion order.184
179. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 19 fig.3 (plotting research findings to show a
drop of injunction grants in the district courts post eBay); cf. Streur, supra note 178, at 67–68
(finding that the district courts have returned to applying broad rules for granting injunctions).
180. The ITC is charged with investigating unfair imports of products to protect domestic
industries from unfair methods of competition and patent infringement. See Thomas Yeh, The
International Trade Commission and the Nonpracticing Entity: Reviving the Injury Requirement
for Domestic Industries Based on Licensing, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1574, 1576 (2012)
[hereinafter Yeh, The ITC and the NPE]. Following section 337 for patent infringement or other
intellectual property rights, the ITC divides NPE cases into two categories: (1) NPEs including
manufacturers who do not practice their asserted patents; inventors who built a prototype or
invested in R&D, but have not yet manufactured or practiced the patent; startups that possess IP
rights but do not yet manufacture a product that practices a patent; universities and labs that do
not make products but license and (2) PAEs whose business model primarily focuses on
purchasing and asserting patents. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, FACTS AND TRENDS REGARDING
USITC SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS (June 18, 2012) [hereinafter USITC Report]. Congress
amended 19 U.S.C. § 1337 in 1988 to allow NPEs to obtain remedies through the ITC. See Yeh,
The ITC and the NPE, supra, at 1576. Congress named only groups mentioned above that were
“equally entitled to section 337 relief as . . . manufacturing industries.” 132 CONG. REC. H1784
(daily ed. Apr. 10, 1986) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
181. The ITC holds in rem subject matter jurisdiction over imported goods that infringe a U.S.
patent. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012); see Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 20, 21 fig.4
(noting that since eBay, NPE cases have increased from 7% to 25%); Ryan Davis, Cisco, Others
Tell Lawmakers to Keep NPEs Out of ITC, LAW360 (July 18, 2012, 5:27 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/360428/cisco-others-tell-lawmakers-to-keep-npes-out-of-itc
[hereinafter Davis, Out of ITC] (reporting that from 2010 to 2012, NPEs brought more than onefourth of all section 337 patent cases at the ITC, and almost half of the respondents at the ITC
were there because of cases initiated by an NPE). But see USITC Report, supra note 180 (stating
that the number of 337 investigations increased over 530% from 2000 to 2011, but that NPE
investigations have not sufficiently increased since eBay).
182. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337. The ITC can grant three different types of injunctive relief, often
in the form of an exclusion order: a limited exclusion order, a general exclusion order, and a cease
and desist order. Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 6 n.16. An exclusion order is considered an
“all-or-nothing” solution as a company must pull all its products from the market and redesign
them to comply. Id. at 4.
183. In 2011, major Smartphone manufacturers, including Apple Inc., Samsung, Song, LG,
Nokia, Motorola, and RIM, were investigated under section 337 by the ITC. Id. at 4–5 n.12.
184. The ITC cannot award damages; it can only grant exclusion orders. Id. at 5. The ITC
also does not adjudicate the merits of an alleged infringement. Id. at 17 (“[T]he ITC neither hears
counterclaims nor recognizes certain defenses to infringement . . . .”). Therefore, a PAE without
a valid patent, or a weak patent, would most likely be successful to obtain an exclusion order in
the ITC. Id. at 17 (“Congress has relaxed the domestic industry requirement, nearly every
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Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 governs the ITC in unfair
practices in import trade.185 Unlike how federal courts act to protect the
rights of private parties, the ITC excludes products to protect United
States domestic markets.186 Under section 337, the complainant has the
burden to prove that a domestic market exists in the United States to
obtain an exclusion order.187 The complainant must show that the
import would harm the U.S. market if permitted into the United States.
The domestic market exists in relation to an intellectual property right if
there is (1) significant investment; (2) significant employment; and (3)
substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, R&D,
or licensing.188 Similar to the four-factor test for the issuance of an
injunction, the ITC considers four public interest factors when deciding
whether to grant an exclusion order if a domestic market exists: (1) the
public health and welfare; (2) competitive conditions in the U.S.
economy; (3) production of like or directly competitive articles in the
United States; and (4) the effect on United States consumers.189 The
ITC historically has been fairly lenient in granting exclusion orders to
PAEs.190
In the Matter of Certain Liquid Crystal Display Devices (“LCD
Displays”),191 a recent case involving a PAE before the ITC, may make
patentee can bring an ITC complaint and nearly every accused infringer is a potential ITC
defendant, converting the ITC into a mainstream venue in which to file patent grievances.”).
185. The ITC is governed by the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (“Unfair methods of
competition . . . in the importation of articles . . . in the United States, or in the sale of such
articles by the owner, importer, or consignee, the threat or effect of which is (i) to destroy or
substantially injure an industry, (ii) prevent the establishment of such an industry, (iii) or to
restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States.”).
186. Id.; Yeh, ITC and the NPE, supra note 180, at 1582 (noting that the purpose behind the
ITC was to protect the U.S. economy from imports that would harm U.S. markets, not to
strengthen IP rights).
187. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (“The Commission shall notify the Secretary of Treasury of
its action . . . directing such exclusion from entry . . . .”); see also USITC Report, supra note 180
(providing background information about the 337 investigations).
188. An exclusion order bars entry of infringing goods. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(419); id. §§
1337(a)(3)(A)–(C).
189. Id. § 1337(d)(1) (“Exclusion of articles from entry, (1) if the Commission determines, as
a result of an investigation under this section, that there is a violation of this section, it shall direct
that the articles concerned, imported by any person violating the provision of this section, be
excluded from entry into the United States, unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion
upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy.”).
190. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 22–31 (finding that the ITC has denied public
interest arguments against exclusion orders only three times in history).
191. In re Certain Liquid Crystal Display Devices, Including Monitors, Televisions, and
Modules, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-749, USITC Pub. 4383 (July 6, 2012)
[hereinafter LCD Devices].
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establishing the existence of a domestic market more difficult for
PAEs.192 The opinion finally clarified the inadequacy of licensingbased evidence to establish a PAE’s “domestic market.”193 The
claimant attempted to prove with evidence of its “investment in the
exploitation through licensing” that the infringing import would harm a
domestic industry.194 The ITC found that the mere ownership of a
patent or acquisition of a patent portfolio does “not warrant
consideration in evaluation of satisfying the domestic industry
requirement.”195 Further, the ITC reasoned that Congress did not intend
for the mere acquisition of a patent to substantiate a domestic
requirement claim: Congress made clear that a claimant must provide
substantial proof that he actively engaged in steps leading to the
exploitation of the invention to meet this requirement. 196 The parties in
this case eventually dismissed and settled after the ITC issued the
opinion.197 Although the ITC took steps to increase the burden to prove
192. Id. at 111 (evaluating PAE licensing activities and whether the activities satisfied the
domestic industry requirement); see Raising the Bar of NPEs to Establish Domestic Industry,
LAW360 (Aug. 8, 2012, 1:26 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/366060/raising-the-bar-fornpes-to-establish-domestic-industry [hereinafter Raising the Bar] (reporting that LCD Devices
clarified the law surrounding licensing-based domestic industries). But see Chien & Lemley,
supra note 43, at 17 (noting that Congress relaxed the domestic industry requirement, providing a
lenient forum for NPEs); Yeh, The ITC and the NPE, supra note 180, at 1589 (“To establish a
licensing domestic industry, the complainant need only demonstrate a nexus between the
licensing activity and the asserted detail.”).
193. LCD Devices, supra note 191, at 110–14. The ITC in this case found that the PAE’s
motivation exploited the patent for financial gain, and that therefore, the PAE would need more
proof to show a domestic industry. Id. at 111.
194. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(C). The claimant, as a PAE, could not prove a domestic market
by a significant investment in plant and equipment. See id. § 1337(a)(3)(A); LCD Devices, supra
note 191, at 111 (providing evidence of litigation fees, patent acquisition fees, and licensing
costs).
195. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(C) (requiring “[s]ubstantial investment in its exploitation,
including engineering, research and development, or licensing”); LCD Devices, supra note 191,
at 110–11 (applying section 337 to the facts of the case).
196. See LCD Devices, supra note 191, at 110–11 (articulating the intent of Congress);
Raising the Bar, supra note 192 (interpreting the Commission’s opinion that because the act of
filing a lawsuit did not meet the substantial proof of exploitation requirement of section
337(a)(3)(C), then PAEs would be limited in proving the domestic industry requirement in the
future); see also LCD Devices, supra note 191, at 116 (“[W]e see no reason to believe that
Congress intended the domestic industry to be established only on the basis of licenses covering
individual patents.”). Additionally, litigation expenses for an underlying 337 investigation do not
establish a domestic industry either. Id. at 113. See generally S. REP. NO. 100-71, at 130 (1987)
(“The mere ownership of a patent or other form of intellectual property rights would not be
sufficient to satisfy this test. The owner of the property right must be actively engaged in steps
leading to the exploitation of the intellectual property, including application engineering, design
work, or other such activities.”).
197. Raising the Bar, supra note 192 (emphasizing the progress of the ITC despite the
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a domestic market for PAEs, it could not go much further than the limits
set by Congress.
Congress, especially within the past few years, expressed the need to
reform the patent system to address PAEs.198 The Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (“AIA”) was passed in 2011 and is the first major
reform to U.S. patent law since 1952.199 The AIA has enacted and will
continue to implement gradual changes to improve the efficiency of
patent prosecution and to keep the USPTO in line with current
technology.200 The increase in PAE activity was one of the driving
factors of the AIA.201 In one provision, the AIA effectively limits
PAEs from joining multiple defendants in one suit; instead of joining
sometimes dozens of defendants because they allegedly infringe the
same patent, the AIA requires the plaintiff to provide another basis for
joinder.202 By limiting joinder, PAEs can no longer easily transfer
successful outcome for a PAE).
198. See America Invents Act: Hearing on H.R. 1249 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Prop., Competition, & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 56 (2011)
(statement of Hon. Steve Bartlett, President and Chief Executive Officer, The Financial Services
Roundtable) (emphasizing the importance of the AIA to “address this problem of nonpracticing
entities that we believe exploit flaws in the current patent system”); 157 CONG. REC. H4420-06
(2011) (statement of Mr. Goodlatte) (stating that the Procedural Matters in Patent Cases
provision, section 19(d), was to “end[] the abusive practice of treating as codefendants parties
who make completely different products and have no relation to each other” except that they
allegedly infringe the same patent). For a summary of Legislative efforts to reduce PAE
litigation, see Jason J. Keener, 10 Ways Congress Tried to Address NPE Litigation in 2013,
LAW360 (Jan. 2, 2014, 6:04 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/494834/10-ways-congresstried-to-address-npe-litigation-in-2013 [hereinafter Keener, 10 Ways].
199. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); see Bryant,
supra note 8, at 680 n.44 (explaining that the AIA is the first major reform in almost sixty years;
the last being the Patent At of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792); see also YEH, supra note
6, at 1 (discussing Congress’ interest in PAEs by (1) requiring further study of PAE litigation in
the AIA and (2) holding House and Senate hearings regarding patent disputes in the ITC since the
passage of AIA).
200. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38–39 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 68.
President Obama signed the AIA into law on September 16, 2011, and the Act was fully
implemented on March 16, 2013. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, AMERICA INVENTS ACT:
EFFECTIVE DATES (2011). This legislation also implemented a change to the “first-to-file”
system, Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3, and a post-grant review of patents for reasons
other than prior art. Id. §§ 6(d), 321–29. See generally Bryant, supra note 8, at 688–91.
201. YEH, supra note 6, at 13; see, e.g., Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement of Eric Smith, President, International Intellectual Property Alliance)
(discussing the complaints about “trolling [which] heightened public interest in patent reform”);
see also Bryant, supra note 8, at 688–92 (analyzing the possible impact of the AIA for PAE
litigation).
202. A PAE litigation strategy is to save litigation costs for separate suits and choose
favorable venue by joining multiple alleged infringers in one suit. Bryant, supra note 8, at 677–

MAHN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Keeping Trolls Out of Court and Out of Pocket

4/30/2014 9:53 AM

1279

venue to choose their forum, and cannot join parties simply because of a
common link to a patent.203 In another provision, Congress requested
further research on PAE litigation to determine if further legislation was
necessary.204
In August 2012, Representatives Peter DeFazio and Jason Chaffetz
proposed the Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal
Disputes Act (“Shield Act”)205 specifically to minimize “patent troll”
litigation involving weak patents.206
Representative DeFazio
introduced the bill, stating that “[pa]tent trolls don’t create new
technology, and they don’t create American jobs. They pad their
pockets by buying patents on products they did not create and then
suing the innovators who did the hard work and created the product.”207
The Shield Act proposes a fee-shifting regime, specifically for high-tech
patent holders who bring meritless lawsuits against alleged
infringers.208 In a loser-pay regime, the court awards a full recovery of

78. Often, the defendants are unrelated and from separate industries. See James Pistorino,
Concentration of Patent Cases in Eastern District of Texas Increases in 2010, 81 BNA PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 803, 805 tbl.1 (2011) (finding that in 2010, 647 patents cases were
filed against 4522 defendants).
203. See Bryant, supra note 8, at 681–82 (“Section 19(d) of the AIA abrogates rulings in a
minority of district courts that interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 to allow defendants
who were tenuously connected to each other to be joined in the same suit.” (citing H.R. REP. NO.
112-98, pt. 1, at 55 n.61); see, e.g., This American Life, supra note 4 (explaining how FotoMedia,
a PAE, named 130 companies in one lawsuit, including large photo-sharing companies like Flickr
and Shutterfly).
204. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 34 (instructing the Government Accountability
Office (“GAO”) to study PAE litigation and report costs, benefits, consequences, and possible
remedies to limit negative impact). See generally Jeruss et al., supra note 98, at 1 (reporting on
the direction of the GAO).
205. Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2012,
H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. (2012) (adding new 35 U.S.C. § 285A(a)). For more detail describing
the Shield Act, see YEH, supra note 6, at 14–15.
206. H.R. 6245 § 2(a). Weak patents generally do not have a reasonable likelihood of
succeeding. See Megan Leonhardt, Congressmen Push Bill to Deter “Patent Troll” Suits,
LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2012, 4:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/366115/congressmen-pushbill-to-deter-patent-troll-suits (announcing the introduction of the bill to stop PAEs “from lodging
meritless suits, which costs U.S. technology companies more than $29 bullion, by forcing the
loser to pay litigation costs”).
207. See Ryan Davis, Patent Troll Bill May Be Too Vague, Narrow to Rein in Suits, LAW360
(Aug. 8, 2012, 10:33 PM), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/368023/patent-troll-bill-may-betoo-vague-narrow-to-rein-in-suits [hereinafter Davis, Patent Troll Bill] (arguing that the
“reasonable likelihood of success” standard is too vague for courts to follow). Although the bill
does not mention PAEs or patent trolls, the subject matter of this statement likely infers that
PAEs are the subject of the bill.
208. H.R. 6245 § 2(a); see YEH, supra note 6, at 14 (explaining that the Shield Act includes a
“rule of construction” section verifying that this section would not “amend[] or interpret[]
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litigation costs to the prevailing party as a punitive measure to
discourage PAEs “from filing baseless lawsuits.”209
More recently, in December 2013, the House of Representatives
approved and passed the Innovation Act, a bill also created to crack
down on “patent trolls.”210 Although H.R 3309 is not the first bill
designed to limit PAEs, it is the first to get through committee, be
passed by the House, and move on to the Senate.211 House Judiciary
Committee Chairman, Bob Goodlatte, sponsored the bill to address
abusive patent suits that damage the U.S. economy. 212 On the House
floor, Representative Goodlatte said that PAEs cause “tens of billions of
dollars spent on settlements and litigation expenses . . . which
represent[s] truly wasted capital.”213
Supported by the Obama
administration, the Innovation Act aims to reveal the nature of such
abusive lawsuits and limit the costs associated with such suits. 214 H.R.
3309 discourages litigants from hiding behind shell companies by
requiring them to reveal the identity of the parent entity, requires more
details regarding infringement allegations in all patent complaints,
limits discovery initially to what is necessary for claim construction,
and includes a loser-pay provision, which requires the non-prevailing
party to pay their opponents’ litigation costs unless the losing party’s
conduct was “reasonably justified.”215
Despite these efforts and proposed solutions to limit trolling tactics,
PAEs continue to make headlines and command a growing presence in
business and popular culture. The following Part will analyze the
categories of patent-eligible subject matter”).
209. The bill aims to “ensure[] that American tech companies can continue to create jobs,
rather than waste resources.” Press Release: DeFazio Introduces SHIELD Act to Protect
American Innovation, Jobs (Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://defazio.house.gov/index/php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=792:defazio-introduces-shield-act-to-protect-americaninnovation-jobs&catid=69:2012-press-releases; see infra Part IV (analyzing the Shield Act and its
possible impact on PAEs).
210. Stewart Bishop, Bill Targeting ‘Patent Trolls’ Sails Through House, LAW360 (Dec. 5,
2013, 4:22 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/493431/bill-targeting-patent-trolls-sails-through
-house [hereinafter Bishop, Bill Targeting Trolls].
211. See Keener, 10 Ways, supra note 198 (discussing ten proposals introduced by Congress
to limit NPE litigation).
212. See Bishop, Bill Targeting Trolls, supra note 210; Henry Ford, Patent Trolling, & the
Innovation Act: A Patent Reform Primer, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=uSEH7nYTRh4.
213. Bishop, Bill Targeting Trolls, supra note 210.
214. Id.
215. The Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (adding new 35 U.S.C. §§ 290(b),
281A, 299A, 285). The Innovation Act also adds a provision that shields consumers of allegedly
infringed technology from being sued for patent infringement. Id. §2.
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impacts of PAEs, and the effects of efforts made by Congress, the ITC,
and the legal community.
III. ANALYSIS
Although many problems plague patent laws, public attention has
inflated PAEs into one of the patent system’s most significant issues.
The coercive and trolling techniques and business models are
identifiably opportunistic as they leech off the success and progress of
others.216 Even after recent patent legislation, the patent system needs
further reform because PAEs continue to affect innovation and the
public’s interest.217 This Part asserts that PAEs’ negative effects on
innovation directly contradict the intent of the Framers and the purpose
of the patent system as set forth in the Constitution. Despite the efforts
of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches to salvage the
fundamental purpose of patent law, PAEs continue to successfully reap
the benefits of their exclusionary rights. This Part analyzes the
shortcomings of these efforts and discusses various proposals aimed at
solving the PAE problem.
A. PAEs Run Afoul of the Purpose of the Patent System, Yet Enjoy
Exclusive Rights
Change in technology has shaped patent law over the years; from its
origins during the Industrial Revolution to today’s Information Age.218
Patentable subject matter warranting protection today certainly would
not have been eligible in the 1790s.219 To adapt to modern technology
by changing patentable subject matter, the Supreme Court has
continuously considered the Framers’ intent and the foundational
purpose of the Patent Act.220 And although software patents are
216. See Merges, supra note 56, at 1590–91 (discussing opportunism generally, and how trolls
are opportunistic in today’s patent system).
217. See Posner, Too Many Patents, supra note 19 (discussing the “general problems posed by
the structure and administration of our current patent laws, a system that warrants reconsideration
by our public offices”).
218. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227–28 (2010) (explaining that a useful test for
patentability in the Industrial Age no longer applies to valid patents of the Information Age).
219. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefore . . . .”); see Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (discussing arguments that
“well-established principles of patent law probably would have prevented the issuance of a valid
patent on almost any conceivable computer program” (internal quotations omitted)).
220. In Bilski, the Court evaluated whether a method for hedging risks in commodities trading
was patentable by considering patent history and the Framers’ intent in constructing the Progress
Clause in the Constitution and the first patent law. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
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(arguably) a legitimate unintended byproduct of the Framers, PAEs are
not analogously legitimate.221
With roots in English Law, the U.S. patent system is intended to
protect the discoveries of artisans and inventors while promoting
progress in technology for the public good. The Framers intended for
the patent system to benefit the public and protect individual
inventors.222 Exclusive patent rights “fuel the fire” of creativity by
providing incentive to invest in development and commercialization of
inventions.223 In accordance with the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
a patent is a privilege because it is conditioned for a public purpose.224
The Framers intended for the public to benefit from not just
disclosure of a patent, but also the patented technology developed and
brought to the public.225 The language of the Constitution implies that
inventions will be pursued for the “Progress of Science.”226 The
Progress Clause in the Constitution is among the other enumerated
rights established by Congress that protect the public.227 Nestled next
to the power to establish post offices and postal roads and creating

221. Courts have yet to explicitly state that PAEs are a legitimate unintended consequence of
the patent system, as courts have stated in reference to software patents. The legitimacy of
patenting software, however, is highly controversial, and many do not believe that it warrants
patent protection. Posner, Too Many Patents, supra note 19.
222. The Supreme Court in Motion Pictures articulated the “patent bargain” intended by the
Framers:
A restriction which would give to the plaintiff such a potential power for evil over an
industry which must be recognized as an important element . . . of the nation. . . would
be gravely injurious to that public interest, which we have seen is more favorite of the
law than is the promotion of private fortunes.
Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502, 519 (1917) (emphasis added).
223. See Abraham Lincoln 2d Lecture, supra note 3.
224. 402 U.S. 313 (1971); see Tokic, supra note 48, at 2 n.9 (noting that antitrust law and
patent law are complementary, as both share the common goal of “promoting innovation and
enhancing consumer welfare”).
225. See Rajec, supra note 10, at 734–35 (“The disclosure-for-protection trade-off assumes
that a patent holder will use this time to profit from producing or licensing the invention, thus
rewarding her investment in research and development and benefiting the public by granting
access to the technology before the patent expires.”); see also McFeely, supra note 1, at 290
(“[T]he statutory requirement for a patent holder to disclose its innovation is not enough alone to
justify the extent of patent rights granted—society too must be allowed to benefit by getting
access to the fruits of the innovation as they become available.”).
226. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries . . . .”);
see Rajec, supra note 10, at 734–35.
227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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tribunals,228 the Progress Clause establishes the “patent bargain” to
benefit both society and the individual.229 To claim that disclosure of a
patent alone is the intended “benefit” to society is to overlook the
original intent of the Framers.230
The Framers did not intend for the “benefit” conferred on the public
to be the disclosure of obscure patent claims as it is today. The Framers
intended for the public to benefit by receiving either (1) an educational
description of an invention capable of spurring ingenuity and novel
improvements or (2) public access to the actual useful product or
invention available for use by the public.231 Upon finding that PAEs
neither disclose useful information nor facilitate the public’s access to
technology, Congress can limit PAEs.
A PAE describes more than just a class of patent holders, and
encompasses anyone who implements trolling tactics as a business
practice.232 PAEs are an unfortunate and opportunistic byproduct of the
patent system.
Following the words and interpretation of the
Constitution, PAEs do not “promote the science and the useful arts.”233
Useful implies that the Framers did not intend for patent rights to be
granted without utility, meaning benefitting the public in education or
invention. The fact that a patent later proves to be useless or cannot be
brought to market because a small inventor lacks funds, does not mean
228. Id. § 8, cls. 7, 9.
229. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)
(explaining that the patent system creates a “carefully crafted bargain”—a mutual beneficial
exchange of disclosure of technology for exclusive patent rights).
230. See supra note 225 (arguing that disclosure is not enough in most cases).
231. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227–28 (2010); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (explaining that exclusive patents rights incentivize inventors
whose “productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the
introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy”); Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (identifying that the “disclosure of
inventions” was “one of the primary purposes of the patent system”).
232. NPEs, as the Court stated in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., may
not practice a patent because it may not be a wise business choice. 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
Universities that clearly promote progress in technology and the dissemination of education, are
not necessarily equipped to manufacture an invention. Independent inventors who assert their
patent should not be lumped into the PAE category because their practices do not run counter the
purpose of the Constitution. See also Love, supra note 32, at 40–41 (describing troll tactics
adopted by product firms); Merges, supra note 57, at 1611 (“Trolling, to put it simply, is a matter
of behavior rather than a status.”).
233. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see McFeely, supra note 1, at 304 (“The patent troll’s
failure to uphold its end of the ‘carefully crafted bargain’ . . . suggests that that it should not enjoy
the powerful rights granted under the U.S. patent system.” (internal citations omitted)); Kessler,
supra note 114 (proposing that Congress focus on emphasizing the words of the Constitution to
limit patent trolls).
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that the patent is not useful. However, when a patent holder makes no
effort to bring a useful product to market, the negative implication of the
utility theory should hold true—the patent holder should have no right
to enforce it. In fact, PAEs impede efforts to bring products to market.
Because they create a barrier to public access to technology, PAEs
should not have a right to enforce their patents.234
There is nothing equitable about trolling business practices, yet PAEs
and practicing entities are equally protected under the law. PAEs do not
seek to enforce their constitutional rights to protect a product, because
they do not have a product to protect nor do they want to want to create
a product.235 They are only interested in the economic benefits of
threatening practicing entities into paying licensing fees or settlement
costs.236
PAEs practice identifiable trolling techniques, further
separating their conduct from that of practicing entities. For one, PAEs
assert their patents in the final years of the patent term; PAEs account
for 92% of NPE suits ongoing within the last three years of the patent’s
term.237 By waiting so long, the alleged infringers have much to lose at
that point and are likely to settle rather than litigate. In contrast,
practicing entities assert their patent rights early in the patent term,
when the technology is most valuable.238 But, because PAEs have
enormous leverage, defendants are easily convinced to settle or to pay
unreasonably high royalties regardless of the patent’s validity.
Opportunistic entities inequitably derive a greater benefit from the
laws than those the laws are intended to protect.239 A Patent Litigation
Study conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP determined that
courts award PAEs significantly higher damages than practicing
entities.240 The study defies common logic because PAEs have a
234. See Harkins, supra note 1, at 426 (explaining that PAEs do not promote progress, as the
Constitution intends, because they essentially inhibit access to technology).
235. See Love, supra note 32, at 9 (noting that PAEs value patents for their “usefulness in
extracting royalties and damages from product-producing companies).
236. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 400 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (differentiating between an NPE and a PAE, and noting that a PAE’s sole business
strategy is to make a profit from litigation); LCD Devices, supra note 193, at 111–14 (discussing
the business model of a PAE).
237. Love, supra note 32, at 33, 41–47 (proposing that Congress limit the patent term because
PAEs, in contrast to practicing entities, assert their patents late in the patent term).
238. See id. at 8 (explaining that product companies value patents for their exclusionary power
and tend to “file suit (if at all) soon after their patents issue to fend off competitors developing or
introducing similar products”).
239. See American as Apple Pie, supra note 4 (noting how U.S. patent laws enforced to
protect small inventors actually benefit PAEs).
240. Davis, Higher Damages, supra note 125 (reporting that between 2006 and 2011, the
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disproportionately small amount of damages and costs already in their
favor. Because they have no product to protect, PAEs accumulate
limited discovery costs, minimal actual damages, and are immune to a
retaliatory counterattack of infringement.241 For these reasons, PAEs
do not come to court with “clean hands.”
B. PAE Detrimental Effects on Innovation
PAEs slow innovation, target startups and small companies, harm
global competitiveness, and impose costs on innovators and the public.
Though PAEs categorically file the greatest number of lawsuits, they
ironically rarely prevail at trial.242 PAEs initiate infringement suits for
profit, depending on their prey to cave in and settle because of pressures
from investors and from the high costs of litigation.243
The high litigation costs exemplify the heavy burden patent litigation
places on innovation and the competitive market. From 2004 to 2009,
PAE infringement lawsuits jumped by 70%, and licensing demands
increased by 650%.244 The risk of getting sued by a PAE became more
likely than not, especially for startups.245 Larger companies started to
factor in the likelihood of PAE litigation when making investment
decisions.246 These expectations deterred innovation by raising costs

median damages award was $6.9 million for NPEs and $3.7 million for practicing entities).
241. It costs $1.5 million for discovery where $1 to $25 million is at stake. YEH, supra note
6, at 11 n.98 (citing AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 59). And for suits where
over $25 million is at stake, discovery costs $3 million. Id.; see also id. at 13 (explaining that
PAEs take on little risk when initiating a law suit).
242. See Tokic, supra note 48, at 1 (finding that NPEs rarely succeed on the merits at trial,
and that a majority settle); see also Porter, supra note 1 (“Regardless of legitimacy of their
claims, the aggressive litigation could have a devastating effect on society as a whole, shortcircuiting innovation.”).
243. See Tokic, supra note 48, at 7 (explaining how RIM and NTP settled their dispute due to
the pressure from investors and worried customers).
244. This American Life, supra note 4.
245. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 20–22; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 54–60
(explaining that in the absence of clear notice, PAEs are able to sue unsuspecting infringers);
Merges, supra note 57, at 1590–91 (discussing the manner in which PAEs take advantage of the
element of surprise by (1) secrecy of patents during prosecution, (2) the enormous number of
patents in a given industry, and (3) the uncertainty of the scope of ambiguous and broad claims);
see also YEH, supra note 6, at 16 (proposing that the patent system improve notice which would
minimize the effects of PAEs).
246. FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 52–54; see Rajec, supra note 10, at 747; see also Kessler,
supra note 82 (“Clearly we’d be better off having Microsoft, Apple and Google spending $1
billion on developing new products rather than buying up patents as an insurance policy so they
or their partners can battle trolls and keep selling phones. How enlightening if we could see
government actually promote progress as the Founders envisioned.”).
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and risk for companies to bring products to market.247 Moreover, the
costs inherent in patent litigation are essentially wasted: if a defendant
prevails, considerable time and money is still diverted from beneficial
economic activity, such as new R&D.248 And if the plaintiff prevails,
the court awards the PAE significant damages, in turn negatively
impacting the public as the costs for damages will result in increased
price of the product.
According to Bessen and Meurer, smaller companies pay more in
direct PAE litigation costs relative to their size than do larger
companies.249 By intimidating startups with threatened litigation, PAEs
are able to set a royalty rate that is just large enough to induce the
company to settle rather than litigate. An entrepreneur discussed a
personal encounter with a patent troll in an episode of This American
Life, called “When Patents Attack.”250 The entrepreneur created a
photo-sharing startup, but was soon contacted by a patent troll for
allegedly infringing three patents that the patent troll held.251 The letter
requested that the entrepreneur contact the sender immediately to
arrange a settlement, or else the patent troll would take legal action.252
The entrepreneur felt that he had no bargaining power, no control over
the situation, and “no choice but to settle.”253 The original patentee in
this case actually disapproved of the troll’s tactics against the
entrepreneur.254 By selling his invention, he intended that his invention
would be put on the market, not used as leverage to shake down

247. Considering these risks in making their decisions, it is less likely that a company will
bring products into the market. FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 42–43.
248. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 6 (discussing a study that found medical
imagining software companies who were targeted by PAEs and whose sales dropped by one third
because of a “lack of incremental product innovation during the period of litigation”).
249. See id. at 13 (calculating costs relative to the size of companies by analyzing the
companies’ size, reported revenue, settlement amounts, and average litigation costs); see also
Masnick, Problems for Startups, supra note 163 (reporting that patent trolls are increasingly
pursuing startups, the biggest creator for new jobs).
250. In the interview, a PAE victim described his experience settling a dispute with a PAE:
It feels like they’re not reasonable . . . as I’m talking about it now, it’s kind of raising
my heartbeat a little bit because I just remember how I personally felt. Just the huge
amount of anxiety and lack of control over the whole situation. It was just an awful
feeling.
This American Life, supra note 4.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (explaining that the settlement amount was “just enough to put [the small business] in
danger, but not to close [it]”).
254. Id.
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infringers.255 Ultimately, the entrepreneur settled with the PAE for an
undisclosed amount, putting the entrepreneur’s business in serious
danger.256 This story is unfortunately common.
Nathan Myhrvold’s company, Intellectual Ventures, exemplifies the
manipulative and corrupt business practices of a PAE. 257 Claiming to
“invest[] in invention,”258 Intellectual Ventures instead has generated $2
billion in revenue since 2000 by asserting patents to extract licensing
fees.259 Intellectual Ventures has an “invention lab” where it claims to
create “new and useful technologies,” such as the world’s most hightech mosquito zapper which senses mosquitoes from hundreds of feet
away by detecting the speed of their wings.260 Twelve years since its
opening in 2000, This American Life reported that Intellectual Ventures
had yet to commercialize a product for public use (such as the mosquito
zapper), and instead simply added to the increasing prices of consumer
products.261
C. Legislative Efforts to Limit PAE Litigation
Congress made considerable efforts to limit PAEs in today’s patent
system by passing the AIA and proposing the Innovation and Shield

255. See id. (interviewing the inventor of the photo-sharing patents, who thought by selling
his company and patents, the buyer “would expand [his] company and make it prosper”).
256. See id. (noting that the settlement agreement with the patent troll was kept confidential,
and that therefore, the exact license fees are undisclosed).
257. Because of its aggressive trolling, this company has also been called a “Troll on
Steroids.” Id.; see Timothy B. Lee, Nathan Myhrvold’s Evil Genius, BOTTOM UP (Sept. 8, 2009),
timothyblee.com/2009/09/08/nathan-myhrvolds-evil-genius (“[Intellectual Ventures] illustrates in
a way that no law review article could the extent to which the patent system punishes firms that
actually produce useful products.”). One scholar noted that PAEs and practicing entities are
fundamentally different, as they have “asymmetrical incentives, since trolls are only interested in
exacting payments whereas commercializers often resolve infringement disputes without
commercializers through cross-licensing arrangements.” Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability,
88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 286 (2009).
258. FAQ, INTELL. VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com/index.php/about/faq (last
visited Mar. 21, 2014).
259. This American Life, supra note 4.
260. Id.; see Lee, supra note 257 (criticizing Intellectual Venture’s business model in that it
“produce[s] no innovative products, spend[s] minimal amounts on R&D, and make[s] a profit by
compelling firms that are producing products and investing in R&D to pay up”). Intellectual
Ventures generated $700 million in revenue in 2010, compared to Google’s $8.505 billion.
Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, Intellectual Ventures Generated $ 700 Million in Revenues in 2010,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 7, 2011, 5:32 AM), www.businessinsider.com/intellectual-ventures-2010revenue-2011-3; Google’s Income Statement Information: 2012 Financial Tables, GOOGLE
INVESTOR REL., investor.google.com/financial/tables.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
261. This American Life, supra note 4; see Kessler, supra note 82 (discussing the effect of the
BlackBerry case and the extra cost which passed on to the consumer).
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Acts. Congress passed the AIA to eliminate two trolling tactics: forum
shopping and suing multiple parties at once.262 The AIA limits joinder
by requiring the plaintiff to connect the defendants more substantially,
rather than claiming that the defendants simply infringe the same
patent.263 Because PAEs will have the burden of proving a sufficient
nexus to join multiple parties, this will likely lead to more suits filed to
avoid this rule.264 On the other hand, filing separate lawsuits could lead
to significant increases in litigation expenses for PAEs and provide
more opportunities for parties to challenge the validity of asserted
patents.265 The AIA may in fact discourage PAEs from filing lawsuits
for fear of losing their bargaining power.
The Shield Act also attempts to directly target PAEs.266 The Act
includes a loser-pay regime that forces plaintiffs to prove that they are
asserting a valid patent in good faith.267 The loser-pay regime is a
punitive measure for plaintiffs who assert invalid patents in bad faith.
With the threat of paying the defendant’s legal fees, the Shield Act aims
to discourage PAEs from pursuing baseless lawsuits or seeking to
enforce invalid patents. Similarly, the Innovation Act requires that the
loser-pay the opponents’ litigation costs unless there was a justifiable
reason for initiating the lawsuit.268 Currently, when a PAE loses an
infringement case, the defendant cannot recover the costs of litigation
except “in exceptional cases.”269 In a loser-pay regime, the court
requires the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s legal fees for a baseless
action. Considering the high costs of defending an infringement suit,
PAEs may hesitate before filing suit to enforce weak or invalid
patents.270 The loser-pay regime would effectively widen the court’s
262. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 18 fig.2 (showing the decline in filed lawsuits in
district courts following the enactment of the AIA).
263. See Bryant, supra note 8, at 682–83; Jeruss et al., supra note 98, at 29.
264. See Mark Lemley, Things You Should Care About in the New Patent Statute ¶ 7
(Stanford Pub. Law Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1929044, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1929044.
265. The statutory filing fee for a patent infringement suit is $350. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)
(2012); see YEH, supra note 6, at 13.
266. Shield Act, H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. (2012) (adding new 35 U.S.C. § 285A(a)).
267. Id. Often “good faith” is equated with “reasonable likelihood of success.” Davis, Patent
Troll Bill, supra note 207 (summarizing the provisions in the proposed bill and arguing that the
“reasonable likelihood of success” standard is too vague to apply); cf. YEH, supra note 6, at 25
n.120 (rebutting the criticism that “reasonable likelihood of success” is vague).
268. The Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (adding new 35 U.S.C. §285).
269. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party).
270. PAEs, unlike their targets, have nothing to lose and “much to gain” in infringement
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ability to find “exceptional circumstances.”271
The Shield Act narrowly targets PAEs’ favorite technology: hightech patents in the hardware and software industries.272 However,
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”),273 an
international trade agreement of 157 member countries, prohibits any
patent legislation that discriminates against a certain industry of
technology.274 The Shield Act only applies to asserting high-tech
patents, therefore excluding other areas of technology prohibited by
TRIPS. Additionally, the Shield Act applies to an industry, not a type
of patent holder and would consequently apply to NPEs as well—which
should not be affected by this legislation. The most concerning
problem, however, is that the bill does not affect those who settle with
PAEs—the most common resolution for PAE suits.
The Innovation Act, on the other hand, may limit the number of PAE
settlements by limiting discovery costs. 275 This provision limits the
cost of discovery to only what is necessary for claim construction by the
court.276 This essentially prevents a PAE from using the high costs of
discovery to force a settlement. Unlike the Shield Act, the Innovation
Act does not discriminate between fields of technology. In fact, the
provisions of the Innovation Act would apply to all patent cases.
Representatives John Conyers and Mel Watt fear that the Innovation

litigation.
271. The Patent Act currently provides the courts the power to award reasonable attorney fees
in exceptional circumstances. Id. But the Innovation Act would make this option available
where the reason for litigation is “unjustifiable.”
272. Shield Act, H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. (2012) (adding new 35 U.S.C. § 285A(a)). PAEs
own patents mostly, if not entirely, within the high-tech industry.
273. TRIPS is an international agreement administered by the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) requiring that all member countries implement standard intellectual property
regulations. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27.1, Apr.
15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; see also YEH,
supra note 6, at 24–25 (discussing the possible conflict with the Shield Act and TRIPS
provisions); Davis, Patent Troll Bill, supra note 207 (noting the discrepancies of the Shield Act).
274. See YEH, supra note 6, at 15–16 (arguing that the Shield Act may be in tension with
TRIPS because the Shield Act only applies to high-tech patents). According to the TRIPS
agreement, all patents must “be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to
the . . . field of technology.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 273, art. 27.1. However, a provision
in TRIPS includes an exception permitting differentiation from different fields of technology for
“legitimate reasons.” Id.
275. The Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. §3 (2013) (adding 35 U.S.C. §299A). The
Innovation Act addresses some solutions proposed in the Shield Act, as well as other legislation
proposed in Congress in early 2013. See Keener, 10 Ways, supra note 198.
276. See Bishop, Bill Targeting Trolls, supra note 210.
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Act encroaches on judicial autonomy and case management.277
Congressman Conyers staunchly opposed the bill’s wholesale changes
to the patent system, but agrees that something must be done to mitigate
PAE abuses.278
D. Courts’ Efforts to Approach PAEs Equitably
The judiciary preceded Congress in taking action against PAEs. The
Court’s decision and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay has greatly
influenced the way district courts decide permanent injunctions for
PAEs.279 Since 2005, district courts rarely grant injunctions to PAEs in
infringement suits.280 Soon after the eBay decision, district courts
began to distinguish NPEs from PAEs. For PAEs, courts looked to
whether the plaintiff competed with the defendant and the amount of
market shares the plaintiff possessed.281 Following Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence, courts began denying injunctions to non-competitors who
did not have a market share, presumably because they did not practice
the patent.282 Although eBay took away a PAE’s powerful weapon of
the threat of injunctive relief, PAEs still effectively compel defendants
to settle before making it to court and seek out exclusion orders in the
ITC.
E. ITC Efforts to Limit PAEs from Obtaining Exclusion Orders
The ITC’s lenient policy on exclusion orders provided an effective
forum for PAEs to maintain leverage in the wake of the eBay case.283
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 400 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
280. Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 11 (finding that district courts have lowered their rate
of granting injunctions by 20% since eBay, and PAEs have been denied injunctions 75% of the
time). But see generally Robin M. Davis, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: Permanent
Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 and
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 434–35 (2008)
(“Although praiseworthy, the new standard for issuing injunctions established by eBay, Inc. is not
as effective of a limit on the activities of patent trolls . . . .”).
281. See, e.g., Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 862 (Fed Cir. 2010) (affirming
the district court’s decision that granted an injunction to a competitor who showed a loss of
market share as a result of infringement); see Rajec, supra note 10, at 750–52 (“[I]njunctions are
denied to non-competitors who have no market share, presumably because they neither produce
nor market the patented product.”).
282. See e.g., Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007); see also
Rajec, supra note 10, at 752 (“Instead of simply using the lost market share as an indicator of
irreparable injury and inadequacy of money damages, courts correlate the size of the market share
and the resulting entitlement to an injunction.”).
283. The ITC does not challenge or question patent validity in 337 investigations, thus, PAEs
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The ITC’s opinion in LCD Devices evaluated whether a PAE’s
acquisition and exploitation of a patent portfolio warrants an exclusion
order under section 337 of the Tariff Act.284 The ITC identified the
claimant’s business model and held that purchasing a patent portfolio
does not merit protection as a domestic market.285 The opinion focuses
on congressional intent and states that Congress did not intend for
section 337 to protect the individual rights of PAEs but rather
“universities and small businesses.”286
The domestic market requirement, in theory, compels a complainant
to establish the necessity of public protection, rather than protection of
the individual’s rights. The equitable considerations of the public
interest in LCD Devices reflect the intent of Congress’ amendment:
NPEs, not PAEs whose business model is solely to extract fees, may
establish a domestic market.287 Additionally, the domestic market
requirement is meant to protect injury to an industry, and a PAE, which
does not have an industry (other than acquiring and asserting patents),
therefore cannot claim an injury under this statutory provision.288
Ryan Davis of Law360 suggests that the domestic industry
requirement be amended so “it only covers licensing that promotes the
adoption and use of patented technology to create new products.”289 In
trying to assert weak patents will not fear losing the patent if challenged. See Chien & Lemley,
supra note 43, at 3; see e.g., Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that
“eBay does not apply to Commission remedy determinations under Section 337”).
284. See LCD Devices, supra note 191, at 111 (“[W]e agree with the ALJ that [claimant]’s
motivation is similar to most patent owners, who acquire patents, either through prosecution or
purchase, for the purpose of exploiting them for financial gain.”).
285. See id. (asserting that Congress did not intend to support the licensing business model of
a PAE); see also Yeh, ITC and the NPE, supra note 180, at 1586–87 (explaining the reasons why
Congress amended the Tariff Act—for example, so that universities and research institutions
could prove that a domestic industry existed).
286. See LCD Devices, supra note 191, at 114 (“Permitting complainants to rely on these
activities and investments to establish a domestic industry, would be inconsistent with the statute
and legislative history which imposes an affirmative requirement of demonstrating the domestic
industry . . . .”).
287. Congress amended 19 U.S.C. § 1337 in 1988, recognizing that the “United States’
economic strength was transitioning from manufacturing to technology and innovation.” Yeh,
The ITC and the NPE, supra note 180, at 1586–87. Congress amended the statute by (1)
expanding the domestic industry to cover licensing activities, and (2) eliminating the requirement
that complainants demonstrate substantial injury. These amendments intended to protect entities
engaged in “innovation-driven activities,” such as universities and small businesses. 132 CONG.
REC. H1784 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1986) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
288. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2012).
289. Davis, Out of ITC, supra note 180 (discussing how LCD Devices will make it more
difficult for PAEs to establish an exclusion order which enables holdup). But see Yeh, The ITC
and the NPE, supra note 180, at 1583 (proposing a change because the ITC is apparently too
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fact, this proposal would be in line with congressional intent as
explained in LCD Devices. Davis’ amended requirement would not
encompass the licensing activities of a PAE, as those private rights are
not worthy of protection if they are detrimental to the public.290
Although the ITC’s opinion stepped towards defeating PAEs’ success in
obtaining exclusion orders, the PAE in LCD Devices established a
domestic market by citing evidence of activities relating to licensing,
including employee time, facility use, travel, and other expenditures.291
In the future, PAEs may utilize the reasoning of the ITC’s opinion to
satisfy this loose requirement.292
F. Other Proposals to Keep Patent Trolls Out of Pocket
U.S. patent law is far from perfect; and individuals, ranging from
bloggers to law professors, propose patent reform to improve the
inherent flaws of the patent system. Where the efforts of Congress, the
courts, and the ITC fall short, others interested in the field propose
solutions to combat PAEs.
Some propose limiting PAEs by enforcing an expanded misuse
doctrine. Daniel McFeely, J.D. from Arizona State University,
proposes that the misuse doctrine applies to a patent holder who fails to
license or practice the patent, effectively rendering the patent
temporarily useless.293 McFeely’s solution defines an entity’s failure to
practice a patent as misuse and suggests that the patent holder cannot

lenient in allowing PAEs to obtain an exclusion order on a foreign import).
290. What I mean by this is that a PAE can get the ITC to exclude an import by claiming
patent infringement. Essentially, ITC suits with PAE claimants may actually prevent useful and
beneficial products from entering the U.S., thus harming the public on an international level. For
example, PAEs may be able to establish that their licensing activities and business may meet the
337 requirements to establish a domestic industry. However, these licensing activities do not
promote innovation or create new products like a university or a R&D firm.
291. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(C); see LCD Devices, supra note 191, at 115 (finding that a
domestic market was established, but holding that certain licensing activities were not sufficient).
292. But see Davis, Out of ITC, supra note 181 (asserting that the Commission’s language and
opinion, regardless of the ultimate finding, will make it harder for PAEs to establish the domestic
market requirement).
293. See McFeely, supra note 1, at 304–12 (arguing that his proposal would be “readily
justified on the grounds” of fundamental fairness, protecting innovation, protecting industry, and
protecting society from social and economic harm). But see Rajec, supra note 10, at 777 n.240
(“The Court’s concern, expressed in eBay, with ‘the economic function of the patent holder’—
namely, its concern with patent holders who exist merely to extract high licensing fees through
the threat of litigation—cannot be addressed with a finding of patent misuse, despite the fact in
such cases, ‘the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations . . .
and an injunction may not serve the public interest.’” (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
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exercise its rights unless it practices the patent or licenses to a practicing
entity.294 This proposal does not distinguish between NPEs and PAEs,
because it applies to anyone who fails to practice a patent. This would
be unfair to certain NPEs, such as small inventors, who do not have the
means to market their patents. Another issue with this proposal is that a
PAE would lose its patent only temporarily until the misuse is purged.
This remedy is too lenient because a PAE can circumvent the nonuse
with “proof” of practicing the patent, just as patent holders have done in
the past.295 For example, a PAE, like Intellectual Ventures, may easily
prove that it “practices a patent” by inventing without legitimately
making efforts to release the product to the public.296 University of
Iowa Law Professor Christina Bohannan proposes a more specific
evaluation for courts by looking to the patent holder’s conduct and
determining whether the conduct “forecloses competition, future
innovation, or access to public domain” in determining misuse.297
Other literature proposes a public-interest-centered equitable test for
granting injunctions.298 Law Professor Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec from
George Washington University proposes that courts focus more on the
public interest requirement of the four-factor test for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction because market share does not accurately
distinguish NPEs from PAEs.299 Following her proposal, courts would
294. See McFeely, supra note 1, at 304 (overstepping the legality of nonuse in the Patent Act);
supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting that a patent holder does not need to use its patent);
see also Posner, Too Many Patents, supra note 19 (proposing that Congress enforce abandonment
(i.e., if a patent holder does not practice a patent, then he will effectively “abandon” his rights to
exclude)).
295. “Using” or practicing a patent would not necessarily be difficult to show for a patent
holder because they have the ability to do any of the following: make, use, sell, offer to sell, and
import. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). In the case of a computer program, for instance, running
the program would be considered “use.”
296. Intellectual Ventures has a research lab focusing on frivolous inventions. This American
Life, supra note 4. Intellectual Ventures could easily follow each step of a process patent or
create an invention in their massive lab—considered a “playground for scientists and engineers.”
Id.
297. Bohannan, supra note 14, at 478.
298. See Rajec, supra note 10, at 773–83 (proposing that courts use market share critically,
thus focusing on the public interest prong for granting injunctive relief); see also Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 20 (showing that a stay of the issuance of injunctive relief to allow designarounds would reduce holdups). A design-around is an alternative to granting an injunction.
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 20. A defendant, rather than being barred from production, can
alter the design so that it no longer infringes. Id.
299. See generally Rajec, supra note 10, at 763–73 (explaining the limits of markets share as
an indicator of irreparable injury and inadequacy for money damages for determining
injunctions); see also Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 32–35 (proposing that the ITC take a
more flexible approach when considering the public interest for ordering exclusions).
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focus on the public interest prong by considering the following
interests: (1) granting sufficiently strong rights to incentivize
innovation; (2) gaining access to an invention through patent disclosure
and eventual dedication to public domain; and (3) gaining earlier access
to invention through its market availability by the patentees or its
licensee.300 Focusing on these interests, courts would better determine
the intent of the patent holder and whether the patent holder deserves a
preliminary injunction.301 This proposal, however, focuses on the issue
of preliminary injunctions, and does not solve a defendant’s
overwhelming litigation costs or PAEs’ tactic to settle.
Law Professor Brian J. Love from Santa Clara University proposes
that Congress decrease the patent term or increase the frequency and
magnitude of maintenance fees in the latter half of the patent term.302
Love’s studies suggest that PAEs, and those that utilize PAE
techniques, enforce their patent rights in the last years of the patent
term.303 Specifically, PAEs account for 92% of NPE suits ongoing
within the last three years of the disputed patent’s term.304 Love argues
that reducing the patent term would insulate practicing entities without
harming incentive for other industries.305 Love bases his reasoning on a
random sample of asserted patents, analyzed in relation to the age of the
specific patent.306 Many patents that avoid litigation, and did not
appear in his studies, could lose three years of market protection
without detriment.307 However, Love notes that just as opportunists
change strategies with time, a PAE would assimilate to the shorter
patent term by enforcing their patents sooner.308 While this would
minimize the loss of “sunk costs” of victims of ex post licensing, Love’s
proposal does not stop PAEs from asserting patents altogether.
Shifting focus from the federal courts to the ITC, Law Professors
Colleen Chien from Santa Clara University and Mark Lemley from
300. Rajec, supra note 10, at 775–83. Professor Rajec articulates this bargain: incentive to
innovate (exclusive patent rights), in exchange for disclosure and access to technology by the
public. Id.
301. Id.
302. See generally Love, supra note 32, at 1 (suggesting that his proposal would enhance
innovation by shortening the patent term).
303. Id. at 33.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 42–43.
306. Id.
307. See id. (arguing that the pharmaceutical industry, and others, would not be significantly
impacted).
308. Id.
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Stanford suggest that the ITC adopt a flexible approach to consider
public interests for exclusion orders.309 Under section 337, the ITC
must consider public health and welfare and competitive conditions as
the “overriding considerations in the administration of this statute.”310
Historically, however, the ITC rarely denies exclusion orders for public
interest reasons.311 Chien and Lemley propose that the ITC use its
discretion to adjust remedies in an infringement case.312 For example,
the ITC must evaluate whether the value of the claimant’s patent is
small compared to the value of the product as a whole and “craft” a
remedy according to the impact on the consumer and the market.313
The ITC can modify what the exclusion will cover (rather than the
whole product); when to implement the exclusion order (instead of
immediate implementation); and set a bond to allow imports for a
royalty fee.314 This proposal properly focuses on the intent of Congress
and the flexibility allotted to an administrative agency. Unfortunately,
this affects the ITC rather than federal courts and does not distinguish
between NPEs and PAEs.
Thomas Yeh, J.D. from George Washington University, proposes
amending the domestic market requirement to limit PAEs.315 Yeh
suggests that Congress change back the domestic industry provision to
the pre-1988 amendment, requiring complainants to demonstrate “the
effect or tendency of the importation and sale of the infringing articles
[would] destroy or substantially injure the domestic licensing
309. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 32–46 (proposing that the ITC adjust the remedy
grants of exclusion orders to limit PAE power of holdup, while providing equitable remedies less
severe than an exclusion order).
310. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2012). Initially, Congress intentionally considered public
interest factors including competitive conditions in the U.S.:
Should the Commission find that issuing an exclusion order would have a greater
adverse impact on the public health and welfare; on competitive conditions in the
United States economy; on production of like or directly competitive articles in the
United States; or on the United States consumer, than would be gained by protecting
patent holder then the Committee feels that such exclusion order should not be issued.
Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 29 n.86 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 197 (1974)).
311. The ITC only found that public interest trumped exclusion in three cases involving
human health or some other nationally recognized policy. Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 23;
see, e.g., In re Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022
(Dec. 17, 1979) (denying an exclusion order because the public interest in fuel efficiency
outweighed other factors).
312. Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 34–36.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 36.
315. Yeh, The ITC and NPEs, supra note 180, at 1593–99 (proposing that the ITC amend the
domestic industry requirement, requiring PAEs to satisfy a higher standard).
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industry.”316 Additionally, this amendment would eliminate the
presumption of injury for licensing industries, raise the standard for
PAEs to establish a domestic industry, and further benefit section 337
investigations.317 Yeh’s proposed amendment would not affect the
capacity of NPEs, such as a university or small business, to show a
substantial injury.318 An NPE could establish that an import affects or
has affected its licensing negotiations and royalty rates. 319 PAEs, on the
other hand, could not rely on the presumption of injury allowed in the
past.320 Without this presumption, PAEs would need more evidence to
establish a significant injury related to the patent.321 Yeh’s proposal is
simple, and seemingly easy to implement. However, the ITC can
effectively distinguish NPEs from PAEs without amending the statute
by strictly following the opinion in LCD Devices.
Other proposals include improving notice requirements,322 enforcing
claim definiteness,323 restricting patentability of business methods and
software patents,324 supervising patent damage awards proportionate to
the value of the patented technology,325 enforcing a time-limit for
practicing the patent,326 requiring that patent holders use the patent,327
and implementing a fee-shifting regime.328 One recent study even goes
so far to propose that the U.S. patent system be eliminated
316. See Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 316(a), 48 Stat. 858, 943 (repealed 1930); see also
Yeh, The ITC and NPEs, supra note 180, at 1593.
317. Yeh, The ITC and NPEs, supra note 180, at 1593–99.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1594–95; see supra note 284 and accompanying text (noting that in LCD Devices
the Commission did not consider patent ownership or legal fees sufficient activity for the
domestic industry requirement).
321. Under sections 337(a)(3)(A) and (B), a complainant must assert a nexus between the
asserted patent and the licensing activities, not the injury. Yeh, The ITC and NPEs, supra note
180, at 1594–95.
322. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 23 (suggesting that improving notice is a top priority
of the patent system and will “make the patent system perform more like an idealized property
system”).
323. FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 95; YEH, supra note 6, at 16 (arguing that improved notice
would limit PAEs’ ability to conduct surprise attacks and would improve the alleged infringers’
awareness of the existing patent).
324. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 23.
325. Id.
326. See Love, supra note 32, at 1; Kessler, supra note 82; Posner, Too Many Patents, supra
note 19.
327. See McFeely, supra note 1, at 310; Kessler, supra note 82 (“It’s time to require patent
holders to actually make or sell products before citing infringement.”).
328. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 23–24 (suggesting that an “aggressive fee-shifting
regime” would diminish a troll’s bargaining power).
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completely.329 Each proposal addresses some PAE factors, but not all.
IV. PROPOSAL330
PAE activity undermines the purpose of the patent system as set forth
in the Constitution and directly harms public interests by permitting
opportunistic legal entities to take advantage of the patent system. The
harm that PAEs cause the public and the patent system greatly
outweighs any benefits PAEs may provide to small inventors. This
Comment proposes an equitable approach to prevent the negative
effects of PAE litigation. With the public’s interest as the key
underlying factor, this Part proposes a combination of ideas and themes
inherent in patent law and existing doctrines to expand the inequitable
conduct doctrine. This proposal aims to extinguish exclusive rights of
PAEs and arm defendants with an equitable affirmative defense to
combat trolls quickly and cheaply. The expanded inequitable conduct
doctrine contorts existing law to obtain an equitable solution to protect
innovation and the public from PAEs.331 This Part discusses the
advantages and disadvantages of implementing this proposal. Finally,
this Part describes existing hurdles in solving the PAE problem.
A. Expanding the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine to Protect Public
Interest
The inequitable conduct doctrine grants courts wide discretion to
evaluate the nature of the individual’s conduct, rather than forcing
courts to adhere strictly to the technicalities of patent law. In an age
where the law cannot keep up with the changes in technology, courts
appropriately focus on equity.332 Currently the doctrine imposes a duty
of good faith and candor during the patent prosecution process.333 It is

329. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levin, The Case Against Patents (Fed. Reserve Bank of St.
Louis Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf.; see also Richard Stallman, Patent Law Is,
At Best, Not Worth Keeping, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 389 (2013).
330. This proposal only attempts to mitigate the problem of PAEs. It does not address vague
patents, paper patents, notice, and expensive infringement lawsuits among competing practicing
entities—which also harm the public indirectly.
331. “Obtaining the ‘correct’ result has sometimes demanded slight legal contortions.” Rajec,
supra note 10, at 761; see, e.g., Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech.
Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (finding that the NPE was entitled to an injunction,
without a showing of market share, because it relied on licensing funds for research).
332. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 400 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (focusing on equitable solutions, instead of adhering strictly to the law).
333. 37 C.F.R. §1.56(a) (2013).
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not unreasonable, however, to expect that the patent holder, once issued
a patent, should uphold a derivative duty to the public to act in good
faith when asserting those rights.334 The duty of clean hands required
during the prosecution process should extend to cover the conduct and
use of the patent throughout the patent term.
Like the “candor and good faith” requirement, the defendant may
raise inequitable conduct as an affirmative defense to an infringement
action. Following the theory that the benefit to the public “is more
favorite of the law than is the promotion of private fortunes,”335 a patent
holder has a duty, when enforcing its patent, to ensure that the best
interests of the public are also being served. 336 Otherwise, PAE
litigation would continue to solely promote the private fortunes of PAEs
and their investors. When a PAE asserts a patent in a manner that is
contrary to public interest, the court should render the patent
permanently unenforceable because such activity is contrary to the
constitutional basis for the patent system.337

334. Judge Aldrich’s dissent in Continental Paper Bag discussed the importance of the public
interest in the context of a competitor’s nonuse of a patent for anti-competitive purposes. Cont’l
Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 150 F. 741, 745 (1st Cir. 1906) (Aldrich, J., dissenting), aff’d,
210 U.S. 405 (1908). The Judge suggests that such nonuse is “an attitude which offends public
policy, the conscience of equity, and the very spirit and intention of the law upon which the legal
right [to exclude] is founded.” Id. Judge Aldrich suggested that the equitable remedy of an
injunction was inappropriate in the interest of the public:
[T]he act of acquiring a valuable right, into which the public interest enters, not for use,
but to destroy or withdraw from use, alone involves a certain measure of wrong,
because upon natural and fundamental grounds, it is in a sense wrong to buy and
withhold a thing of public interest and benefit . . . . [T]he right to equitable relief in aid
of the abstract right is forfeited.
Id. at 751; see Eduardo Porter, Tech Suits Endanger Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/business/economy/tech-lawsuits-endanger-innovation.html
(“Patents on inventions . . . are not granted to be fair to their creators. Their purpose is to
encourage innovation, a broad social good, by granting creators a limited monopoly to profit from
their creations.”)
335. Goldman, supra note 42, at 38 (quoting Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg., 243 U.S. 502, 518–19 (1917)).
336. See Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941, 944 (9th
Cir. 1944) (“It is now well established that a patentee may not put his property in the patent to a
sue contra to public interest. The grant of a patent is the grant of a special privilege . . .
conditioned by a public purpose.”); see also Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S.
515, 552 (1937) (“Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and
withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private
interests are involved.”).
337. Typically, courts find that ruling in favor of strong patent rights is in the public’s best
interest. Rajec, supra note 10, at 741–42; see, e.g., Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes, 466 F.
Supp. 2d 978, 985 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (“[T]he public maintains an interest in protecting the rights
of patent holders . . . .”). Courts must “consider” the public interest in the four-factor test when
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By equipping defendants with an appropriate affirmative defense,
Congress would reduce PAEs’ leverage and bargaining power over their
vulnerable targets. Supplemented with precedent, court opinions, the
Patent Act, and relevant equitable tests, the expanded inequitable
conduct doctrine provides a proper course of action for troll victims.
This proposal rests on the foundation of the following three tenets from
patent law and precedent. First, Justices Kennedy and Thomas
identified the differences between NPEs and PAEs, and explained in
eBay that a general rule applying to all NPEs would be improper.338
This proposal recognizes this reality. Second, to address PAEs, the
solution cannot discriminate among fields of technology proposed in the
Shield Act; but should not burden NPEs, for example. Third, a court
cannot force a patent holder to use or license a patent. From this
foundation, the court will apply the Progress Factors derived from the
domestic market requirement from section 337, the evaluative intent
component of the inequitable conduct doctrine, and elements of the
Innovation Act.339 Following these guidelines, the court can apply an
equitable test that effectively distinguishes NPEs from PAEs and other
trolling plaintiffs with “unclean hands.”
This proposal grants the courts wide discretion to determine public
interests surrounding each case. However, as outlined below, the court
should weigh several factors—Progress Factors, which look to good
faith, promotion of progress and innovation, and business model—in
judging the plaintiff’s equitable conduct in asserting the patent.
1. Procedural Standard and Preliminary Hearing
Once the defendant asserts the expanded inequitable conduct defense,
the court should conduct a hearing to determine whether there is
genuine cause for asserting the affirmative defense.340 The expedited
determining if a permanent injunction is warranted. Rajec, supra note 10, at 741. However “the
operating assumption was that in rare cases, the public interest in access to a particular
innovation is strong enough that these access interests trump the right to exclude.” Id. at 741–42,
742 n.31 (emphasis added) (citing MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39
(Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388). In very few cases, courts have denied a patent holder an
equitable remedy in the name of public interest. Id. at 778. Historically, the courts only use the
public interest to deny a permanent injunction for public health reasons. Id. at 776; see also
Chien & Lemley, supra note 43, at 23 (finding that the ITC has only denied exclusion orders in
cases of public health and welfare, improved fuel efficiency, and nuclear physics research).
338. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text (discussing the Kennedy concurrence in
eBay which influenced courts to treat NPEs and PAEs differently).
339. See supra notes 205–15 and accompanying text (discussing the Shield Act, the
Innovation Act, and unique provisions to prevent PAE litigation).
340. The Citizen Participation Act of Illinois (“CPA”) protects individuals from Strategic
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hearing avoids the costs of the early stages of discovery, which tend to
be very expensive for the defendant. Like the Innovation Act’s loserpay regime, the court will force the PAE to pay the defendant’s legal
fees upon a finding of inequitable conduct.
Before considering whether there is liability for infringement, the
court will first determine whether the affirmative defense is invoked
against a proper plaintiff. If the court finds the plaintiff practices, or has
significantly invested in marketing or implementing, the patent for
public access, then the affirmative defense is dismissed and the
infringement case proceeds to discovery. 341 Alternatively, upon finding
that the plaintiff neither practices nor intends to practice the patent, the
court must evaluate the plaintiff’s conduct using the Progress Factors.
2. Progress Factors to Consider Patent Assertion with Clean Hands
Similar to the Shield Act, which shifts the burden to prove patent
validity onto the plaintiff, this affirmative defense similarly shifts the
burden to the plaintiff to prove that it meets the Progress Factors. 342 To
defeat the affirmative defense, a plaintiff must provide clear and
convincing evidence that it is a fair competitor, acting in good faith for
the benefit of the public, and that it is not acting in a mischievous
manner toward the public. The first of the Progress Factors is an
evaluation of the plaintiff’s cause of action with respect to the
Constitution and the intent of the Framers. The second element looks to
the plaintiff’s good faith and whether the plaintiff filed the suit with
“clean hands.” Finally, the court considers the business of the plaintiff
and whether the parties are competitors. None of these factors are
dispositive, and the court has discretion to weigh the factors of each
case.343
Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPP”) suits. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/15 (2012). A
SLAPP suit is used to suppress grassroots movements by filing baseless lawsuits. Id. The Illinois
Anti-SLAPP Statute allows a defendant to counter a SLAPP suit quickly and economically. Id.
The statute allows for a defendant to file a special motion to strike or dismiss a complaint based
on “[a]cts in furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and
participation in government.” Id. Discovery halts until the court determines the legitimacy of the
claim. Id. The court must conduct a hearing and render a decision on the motion within ninety
days, and if the court finds in favor of the defendant, the court will dismiss the case early and
award the defendant attorneys’ fees and court costs. Id.
341. This will effectively weed out practicing entities or NPEs licensing to product companies
by delving deeper than the transparency requirement in the Innovation Act.
342. See supra notes 205–15 and accompanying text (introducing the Shield Act and the
Innovation Act).
343. In trademark infringement cases, the courts approach each case by considering eight
factors to determine whether the use of one mark created a likelihood of confusion with another
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i.

Promote Progress of Science, Transfer Technology, or Encourage
Innovation
The first factor looks to the foundational purpose of patent law and
whether the plaintiff exercised its patent according to the “carefully
crafted bargain.”344 The plaintiff must establish that it made significant
and good faith efforts to use the patent to promote progress of science,
transfer technology,345 or promote innovation. The plaintiff must
establish that asserting the patent does not keep a useful product from
the public or pass any additional costs onto the consumer. The Framers
intended for the patent system to encourage progress and innovation,
and the first factor should not impose undue hardship for the plaintiff to
prove. Thus, if an NPE wishes to enforce its constitutional right of
exclusion, then it has the burden to prove that it deserves protection.
The plaintiff cannot assert a patent solely to make a profit without
showing substantive benefit to the public. Applying this factor to supertroll, Intellectual Ventures, illustrates the “patent bargain.” Intellectual
Ventures’ slogan is that it funds innovation by paying inventors for
valuable patents, thereby returning the “inventors” back to the drawing
board to create more inventions.346 Additionally, it may point to its
frivolous “invention lab” as a research facility, thus promoting progress
of the science in the arts.347 The court can consider each of Intellectual
Ventures’ pieces of evidence and weigh the first factor as merely one
item of evidence. Or, the court can look at the plaintiff more generally
by evaluating the research lab, the type of research, and whether the
general public can benefit from Intellectual Ventures’ work (i.e.,

mark. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 590–700. The court uses its discretion to determine
which factors are dispositive since each case is different. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf,
Inc., 337 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2003) (weighing the first three of the following eight factors: (1)
strength of the mark, (2) relatedness of the goods or services, (3) similarity of the marks, (4) any
evidence of actual confusion, (5) marketing channels used by the parties, (6) probable degree of
purchaser care and sophistication, (7) defendant’s intent, and (8) likelihood of either party
expanding its product line using the marks).
344. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (explaining
that the purpose of the patent system is to create a mutual beneficial exchange of disclosure of
technology for exclusive patent rights).
345. See FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 229 (asserting that R&D firms (considered NPEs)
suffer “as a result of infringement” which “can be analogous to that suffered by manufacturing
patentees, including loss of customer base, industry disregard of its patent rights, and harm to
reputation as an innovator”).
346. See Shrestha, supra note 117, at 128 (“By selling the rights to their invention, the
inventors could focus their attention and resources in the pursuit of inventive activity instead of
spending time and energy trying to commercialize their invention.” (internal quotations omitted)).
347. See This American Life, supra note 4.
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whether the high-tech mosquito zapper will prove successful in the
market).
ii. Good Faith
The good faith requirement examines the intent of the plaintiff in
asserting the patent.348 A court can determine a plaintiff’s good faith by
looking at its business model, knowledge of infringing activity, and the
time of patent assertion.349 For example, if a court were to evaluate the
good faith of Intellectual Ventures, the super-troll would likely fail the
good faith test. First, Intellectual Ventures is one of the largest patent
acquisition firms, with proof from financial records that most of its
revenue comes from licensing fees.350 Even if it pointed to patents it
owns or accumulates, the court looks to the specific patent and whether
the plaintiff is asserting it for profit or actual commercial use. Second,
Intellectual Ventures admittedly buys patents after finding a product
company using patented technology, and then seeks ex post facto
licenses.351 A court would easily recognize Intellectual Ventures’
knowledge of infringement before buying the patent, and determine
348. Although courts evaluate good faith by determining “reasonable likelihood of success,”
this requirement in patent cases looks to the plaintiff’s patent. See YEH, supra note 6, at 15 n.20.
This factor is one of the four factors examined when determining whether to issue a permanent
injunction, and looks to the validity of the patent and whether the defendant infringed. Id.
Because this proposal is meant to be expedited, the court will not use the same evaluation for
good faith. See supra note 267 (discussing the good faith requirement in the Shield Act and its
criticisms); see also supra notes 144–50 (discussing the criticism that PAEs frequently bring
baseless lawsuits).
349. PAEs utilize many tactics, but ex post facto licensing in particular characterizes a PAE.
A PAE acquires patents, looks for possible infringement, and waits to assert the patents until very
late in the patents’ term. These characteristics can be easily detected, and may distinguish a PAE
from an NPE. See supra Parts II.B, III.A (explaining troll tactics of ex post facto licensing where
a PAE acquires patents in a popular technological field, waits for possible infringement, and then
demands license fees or royalty rates). Courts also look to a plaintiff’s intent and knowledge to
determine inequitable conduct, i.e., whether a patent holder knew about and withheld material
information with the intent to mislead the patent office. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (stating that the specific intent
to deceive must be the most reasonable inference drawn from evidence); see also supra Part
II.A.3 (discussing inequitable conduct). Copyright infringement is another area of intellectual
property law where the courts look to the intent of a party. Like patent law, copyright
infringement is a strict liability offense. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 407. However, for
contributory infringement courts will look to a party’s knowledge of certain activity, intent to act,
and business model to determine liability. See, e.g., MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 926 (2005) (finding copyright infringement because the “business model[] employed by
Grokster . . . confirm[s] that their principal object was use of their software to download
copyrighted works.”).
350. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 259–61 and accompanying text.
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whether the patent covers standard technology. Finally, the court could
simply look at the time left in the patent’s term as an indicator of a
PAE.
iii. Fair Competitor
The final factor ensures that an industry beneficial to the public,
rather than private patent rights, is protected.352 Rather than look to
market share, section 337(a)(A)–(C) of the Tariff Act provides a helpful
guide to ensure the plaintiff meets the fair competitor standard.353 The
plaintiff must prove the following: (1) significant investment; (2)
significant employment; and (3) substantial investment in the
exploitation of the patent, including engineering, R&D, or licensing for
early access of the product for public use.354 As in LCD Devices, a
plaintiff cannot use litigation expenses, or mere patent ownership, to
satisfy the third prong.355 Although closely related to the clean hands
factor, the fair competitor standard only evaluates the plaintiff’s
business activities.
As envisioned by the Framers, the exclusive right to sue for
infringement is an essential tenet of patent law.356 However, if a patent
troll asserts a patent, the court will weigh the interests of the public
against the interests of the patent troll using the Progress Factors. As
discussed above, a “PAE” describes conduct and does not merely label
a type of business. Accordingly, some patent holders may pass certain
Progress Factors, yet fail others. Ultimately, the courts must weigh
these factors—as they do in other areas of law—to determine whether

352. See Yeh, The ITC & NPEs, supra note 180, at 1582 (explaining that the domestic
industry requirement in ITC infringement cases ensures that the Commission protects “industries
rather than private patent rights”).
353. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337 (a)(3)(A)–(C) (2012).
354. Id. The domestic industry requirement states:
For purposes of paragraph (2), an industry in the United States shall be considered to
exist if there is in the United States, with respect to the articles protected by the patent,
copyright, trademark, mask work, or design concerned: (A) significant investment in
plant and equipment; (B) significant employment of labor or capital; or (C) substantial
investment in its exploitation, including engineering, research and development, or
licensing.
Id.
355. See LCD Devices, supra note 191, at 110–11 (finding that PAE licensing activities did
not satisfy the “substantial exploitation” requirement, in contrast to the ITC’s lenient history).
356. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States, or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefore, infringes the patent.”).
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they should “appropriately withhold their aid” in finding infringement
when a patent holder asserts its rights with unclean hands.357
B. Advantages and Disadvantages to the Proposal
Courts have leeway and discretion when considering the public
interest and inequitable conduct.358 In Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger, the
Court stated that “[i]t is a principle of general application that courts,
and especially courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid
where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public
interest.”359 Following this principle, courts could easily apply the
expanded inequitable conduct doctrine by evaluating whether the
plaintiff has clean hands.
This proposal will effectively distinguish NPEs, such as universities
and independent inventors, from patent trolls. The Progress Factors
provide a method for courts to determine whether a patent holder
mutually contributes a benefit to society for the exchange of exclusive
rights. A university, for example, could show that it promotes progress
in education and research. Similarly, universities license exclusively to
practicing entities, promoting the technology for actual use and
dissemination.360 The court would dismiss the affirmative defense in
the expedited hearing suit brought against a university or independent
inventor.361

357. See Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (emphasizing the public
interest factors when finding patent misuse).
358. The Patent Act grants district courts the discretion to issue injunctions, damages, and
attorneys’ fees, following rules of equity. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–285; see, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v.
Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“Accordingly, courts have in rare
circumstances exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in order to protect the public
interest”).
359. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492; see, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69
F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934) (denying permanent injunction after finding patent infringement
because granting relief would have “close[d] the sewage plant, leaving the entire community
without any means for the disposal of raw sewage . . . endangering the health and lives of that and
adjoining communities”); see also Broadcom v. Qualcomm, Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 704 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (delaying implementation of injunction because an immediate injunction would adversely
affect the public, network carriers, and related manufacturers).
360. Love, supra note 32, at 19 (noting that all university-owned patents in his study sample
“were at the time of assertion exclusively licensed to product companies that acted as plaintiffs”).
Often, however, universities can license patents to a PAE. See Masnick, University of CA, supra
note 62 (criticizing the University of California for its affiliation with Eolas, a PAE). In this case,
the court would look not just to the university but also to the licensee and its business model.
361. NPEs, including independent inventors and universities, are not PAEs, despite what some
critics might say. Love, supra note 32, at 27. According to Love, independent inventors do not
sit on their patents like a PAE would. Id. (drawing from empirical studies that individual
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PAEs can attribute much of their success to settlements, but with this
affirmative defense as an equitable option, defendants may be more
willing to fight back. This proposal could empower defendants to deny
the settlement offer and decide to go to trial. Equipping the defendant
with a shield, the PAE who would likely sheath its weapons362 for fear
of losing the patent altogether at trial. Supplemented with the
affirmative defense, a defendant with a strong case may not hesitate to
fight a PAE, and the PAE would be forced to pay the defendant’s costs
if the court found inequitable conduct.
Following eBay and TRIPS, this proposal does not discriminate
against the plaintiff or industry. Because this affirmative defense gives
courts flexible discretion to evaluate good faith and business models,
any person or entity practicing troll techniques will be affected.363
Unlike other solutions, this proposal would identify the troll tactics of
product companies and could stop inequitable conduct quickly, and
much more cheaply, for a defendant.
Implementation of the expanded inequitable conduct doctrine may be
arduous for two reasons. First, good faith may be difficult to quantify in
a patent case, as it looks to the subjective conduct of the patent owner
and its business. Courts may believe that a good faith test is too vague
or discriminatory and may be reluctant to implement such a test without
further direction from Congress. Second, determining whether a
company is a competitor may be objectively difficult in complex or
segmented markets. Although courts have done so in the past, using
market share data can provide false positives in determining the
plaintiff’s status as a competitor.364 Despite these issues, however, the
expanded inequitable conduct doctrine has the potential to decrease the
negative impact of PAEs.
inventors, in contrast to PAEs, “file suit quickly on almost the exact same timeline as product
companies”). Studies illustrate that PAEs, rather than NPEs, have a negative effect on
innovation. Id. at 5, 26 (noting that universities and independent inventors did not greatly impact
the NPEs in his studies).
362. See Tokic, supra note 48, at 9 (illustrating that PAEs use the threat of seeking an
injunction and allegations of willful infringement as ‘weapons’ ); Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 113
(chronicling how patent holders use patents as a ‘weapon’); This American Life, supra note 4
(describing defensive patenting as “the old mutually assured destruction. Except instead of
arsenals of nuclear weapons, it’s arsenals of patents”).
363. Many failing practicing entities have adopted troll tactics in efforts to save a dying
business. Love, supra note 32; see supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
364. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 2037–39 (finding that a patented product that
forms a small part of a complex invention may distort the actual value of market share); Rajec,
supra note 10, at 765 (noting that many PAEs may establish considerable market power in their
licensing royalty demands).
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CONCLUSION
U.S. patent law is far from perfect, and this Comment covers only
one issue of many inherent in the current patent system. While the
Constitution is adaptable, the intent of the Framers in the creation of
patent law is not irrelevant or obsolete today. However, the utilitarian
foundation has been lost in recent years among trolls and patent wars.
PAEs clearly do not promote the constitutional purpose of the patent
system set forth by the Framers. Their tactics are legal under today’s
patent system, yet they impede rather than promote the “progress of
science and the arts.”365 Courts have identified PAEs as problematic,
and Congress has attempted to limit their destructive impact, yet efforts
have proven unsuccessful. An expanded proposal of inequitable
conduct, while not addressing every patent troll tactic, will distinguish
PAEs from other patent holders, and permanently purge their
unconstitutional tactics from the courts.

365. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. When a PAE “holdup” causes the final price of the end
product to rise beyond its true economic value, the ‘progress of Science’ is significantly impeded.
Progress in technology creates jobs and increases the standard of living. Any inequitable
manipulation of the patent system undermines the constitutional purpose.

